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NO. 2

PRIVATE PENSIONS: A STUDY OF VESTING, FUNDING,
AND INTEGRATION*
DONALD H. NoRMAN*
INTRODUCTION

A major storm is developing in the field of private pensions. Problems
that have been accumulating with the rapid growth of the private retirement
systems have been brought to public attention by several notable plan failures,
abuses of plan management by both union and employer trustees, and the
searching analysis given the private pension system by the President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds, completed in January 1965.' Congressional hearings, administrative review, and private comment foretell of
sweeping legislative revision of the private pension system. The purpose of
this study will be to examine vesting, funding, and integration with Social
Security in the light of these current trends toward regulation of private
retirement.
A number of causes have contributed to the creation of a system of private
retirement. Public policy has encouraged pension plans and protected them
through tax laws, labor relations statutes, standards of fiduciary obligations
of trustees, and more recently, through specifically designed legislation re2
quiring public disclosure of various aspects of retirement and welfare plans.
This study will emphasize the significance of tax law in the growth and
regulation of the private retirement system. Tax legislation and administrative regulation have furnished the primary tools for governmental control
over private pensions, as well as providing the incentive for expansion of
the system by making it possible to provide these benefits at substantially
lower cost. 3 The article will focus on pension plans, as distinguished from
profit-sharing and stock-option plans and nonqualified deferred compensation

*A Table of Headings and Subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
"A.B. 1952, Rutgers University; J.D. 1955, LL.M. 1968, University of Miami; Member
of The Florida Bar, The American Bar Association, and the Broward County Bar Association.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER RETIREMENT AND
WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS (Jan. 29, 1965) [hereinafter cited as
CABINET CoMMrrrIE REPORT].

2. Id. at vi-vii.
3. Id.
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arrangements. In order to illustrate the significance of proposed reforms for
existing pension legislation, it is desirable to trace the development of the
private retirement system.
Development of Private Retirement
The first private pension plan was established in the United States in
1875 by the American Express Company.4 By 1940, retirement plans had
grown to cover four million people.5 During and since World War II pensions have become a major economic institution. Direct wage increases were
limited under the wage stabilization policy in force during the war, and
workers became more interested in pensions and other fringe benefits. Employers, who were subject to high rates of corporate and excess profits taxes,
regarded such benefits as a relatively inexpensive way of holding their workers and attracting new personnel. 6
There are many factors that have been responsible for the growth of the
private retirement system and, while it would be difficult to choose a primary
one, the following are considered to be among the leading causes:
(1) an increase in life expectancy from forty-seven years at the turn
of the century to over seventy in the 1960's coupled with a decrease in
working expectancy and a consequent increase in the number of years
7
of nonworking old age;
(2) movement of population from rural to urban areas and from
agriculture to industry;
(3) the need for security brought about by the economic upheaval
of the depression of the 1930's, which swept away the life savings of
millions, leading to the establishment of the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance program (OASI) ;8
(4) a desire on the part of workers for a higher standard of living
continuing through retirement;
(5) the desire of employers to increase productivity and reduce
turnover among employees; 9
(6) inability of the average individual to provide post-retirement
income by personal savings and investment, caused by progressive rates
of taxation;
(7) the realization that group action could accomplish the goal of
retirement security while the individual could not;' 0 and
4.

D.

ROTHMAN,

AND TRuST FuNDs 1

ESTABLISHING

AND

ADMINISTERING

PENSION

AND

PROFIT-SHARING

PLANS

(1967).

P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC PowER 6 (1959).
Holland, Some Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, 2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1301 (1959).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES 293 (1967).
8. D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 31 (1964).
9. Id. at 21-23.
10. Goldworn, Pension Plans: Their Background, Current Trends, and an Agenda for
Inquiry, 25 OHio ST. L.J. 234, 235 (1964).
5.

6.
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(8) the tax and other inducements offered by the federal government.
The beginning of a favorable federal tax policy toward private retirement is found in the Revenue Act of 1921,"1 which provided an exemption
from current taxation of income from a trust created by an employer as a
part of a stock bonus or profit-sharing plan for the exclusive benefit of some
or all of his employees. Without specific legislation, reasonable payments as
pensions to retired employees or contributions to a trust for retirement purposes were deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense if,
together with other payments, they constituted reasonable compensation.
The 1921 Act removing the income from profit-sharing or stock-bonus trusts
was not accorded the same status by legislation until the Revenue Act of
1926,12 although administratively pension trusts were treated in a like
manner after 1921.13 Income was taxed to the employees when distributed
or made available.
Deductions for past service contributions were not authorized by the
Revenue Act of 1921. Employers adopted the practice of carrying balance
sheet reserves against their pension obligations, and credits to these reserves
were not deductible to the employer. Increases in size and number of these
reserves led to the enactment of a provision in the Revenue Act of 1928,14
permitting a deduction for reasonable contributions to a trust in excess of
current funding liabilities. Apportionment of contributions to fund past
service credits was required over a, ten-year period in equal amounts. The
ten-year restriction did not apply to plans funded through group annuities.
Two "loopholes" permitted pension plans to lend themselves to tax avoidance
schemes after 1928. A pension trust could qualify for favorable tax treatment if it was created for the exclusive benefit of some or all of the employees.
This permitted plans established for the owners, officers, and key employees
with current deductions available to the corporation and deferral of taxation
to the participants. Secondly, a pension trust was not required to be irrevocable. This allowed an employer to make substantial contributions during
high earning years and deductions against income tax and then recapture
of the funds in poor years by revocation of the trust. Participants lost their
pension expectations and the Government lost tax revenue through these
devices.15
Such abuses led to the enactment of the "nondiversion rule" in the
Revenue Act of 1938,16 which required that it be impossible to divert any
part of such trust funds to purposes other than the exclusive benefits of the
employees at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities. In short,
an irrevocable trust was required. However, it was still possible to create a
plan for only a few favored employees.
11. 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
12. 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
13. D. McGxu., supra note 8, at 24.
14. 45 Stat. 791 (1928).

15. D. McGxu., supra note 8, at 25.
16. 52 Stat. 447 (1938).
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World War II brought a sharp increase in corporate income and excess
profits taxes, together with wage stabilization policies and higher individual
income taxes. Pension plans increased rapidly, and Congress responded with
significant legislation in the Internal Revenue Code of 1942,17 which became
the forerunner of the present provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.18 Capital gains treatment was afforded lump-sum distributions and
more stringent requirements were imposed for qualification. Discrimination
in favor of highly compensated employees was prohibited, irrevocable dedication of funds for retirement purposes was required, a limitation was placed
upon annual contributions, and wider employee coverage was assured.
Organized labor became a vigorous proponent of the private pension
system following a decision of the Supreme Court that a pension plan was
a bargainable issue in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRBS in 1949. This accelerated
the growth of private retirement, which began to cover large segments of the
working force.
The growth of private pension plans and their funds after 1940 is set
forth in Tables 1 and 2, covering industrial and governmental plans, respectively. Coverage under industrial plans has grown five-fold in less than a
quarter of a century, and contributions have increased to twenty times their
1940 level. The number of beneficiaries and benefits has also grown, but,
evidencing the youth of the pension structure, falls below coverage and contributions. Earnings and assets have increased considerably, demonstrating
the development of private pensions from a small financial factor to a major
institution in the market. Similar growth can be observed in governmental
plans.
TABLE 1
Growth of Private Industrial Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
in the United States, 1940-196320

Covered workers (millions)
Contributions (S billions)
Beneficiaries (millions)
Fund earnings ($ billions)
Fund assets (S billions)
Annual change in fnnds ($ billions)

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1963

4.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
2.4
0A

6.4
1.0
0.3
0.2
5.4
0.8

9.8
2.1
0.5
0.3
12.0
1.9

15A
3.8
1.0
0.7
27.4
3.7

21.2
5.5
1.8
1.7
52.0
5.4

23.8
6.2
2.5
2.7
69.9
6.4

17. Int. Rev. Code of 1942, §162A.
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§401-04.
19. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 356 US.
960 (1949). Profit-sharing plans were included in 1953 in NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954).
20. D. HOLLAND, PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS: PROJECTED GROWTH 2 (1966).
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TABLE 2
Growth of State and Local Government Employee Pension Plans,
1940-196221
1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1966

1.4
0.3
02
0.1
1.6

1.8
0.4
02
0.2
2.-5

2.6
0.9
0.,
0.3
5.2

3.5
1.7
0.4
0.6
10.6

4.5
2.9
0.7
1.0
19.7

5.8
4.2
0.9
1.7
33.6

6.1
4.7
1.0
1.9
37.1

Covered workers (millions)
Contributions ($ billions)
Beneficiaries (millions)
Benefit payments ($ billions)
Fund assets ($ billions)

Phenominal growth continues in private pensions. Statistics released by
the Institute of Life Insurance for 1965-1966, shown in Tables 3 and 4,
indicating coverage and assets, emphasize the present size of public and
private retirement.
TABLE 3
Persons covered by All Types of Pensions, 1965-1966 (in thousands)22
Total

All types of plans
Private
Insured
Noninsured (estimate)
Government administered

Retirees

1966

1965

1966

1965

38,619
27,940
7.040
20,900
10,679

37,320
27,060
6,710
20,350
10,170

4,443
2,690
790
1,900
1,753

4,163
2,490
740
1,750
1,673

TABLE 4
Assets of All Types of Pensions, 1965-1966 (in billions)23

All types of plans
Private
Insured
Noninsured
Government administered

1966

1965

$ 139.5

$ 126.5

85.4
27.3
58.1
54.1

77.1
252
51.9
49.4

In his message to Congress in February 1967, President Johnson called
for additional control over private pensions.

The President noted that more

than 40 million workers were then covered by private pensions administering
assets of $90 billion. The very size of the private retirement system was given
as a reason to establish additional safeguards insuring its administration in

the public interest.24
21. Id. at 3, as revised, INsrrrUTE OF Lnm INSURANCE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PENSION
STATES 16-17 (1967) and unpublished data.
22. Institute of Life Insurance, in 21 P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING REP. No. 53, at 4
(Jan. 1967).

PLANS IN THE UNrr

23. Id.
24. 113

CONG.

REc. H 1407 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967).
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Public Interest in Private Retirement
The American public is vitally interested in the private retirement
system. Pension plans provide economic security for millions of workers and
their families; they are a substantial factor in the national savings stream and
money market; they affect labor mobility, incentives, and employment; and
25
they are subsidized by favorable federal tax laws.
In addition to the influence of federal taxation, the government's interest
has grown apace with other aspects of private pensions. Both the Securities
Act of 193326 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 193427 required pension
trusts purchasing stock in employer corporations to file reports of such activities annually.
In 1947, as a beginning step toward basic standards, the Labor Management Relations Act 28 required a written pension agreement, irrevocable use
of funds for benefit payments, and equal union-management representation
in fund administration, with arbitration of disputes. In 1948, the National
Labor Relations Board ruled that the Act imposed a duty on employers to
bargain with representatives of their employees on the subject of pensions.
After this decision was affirmed by a federal court in Inland Steel in 1949,29
the collectively-bargained pension plan flowered as a part of the private retirement system.
With the continued growth of pension plans throughout the 1950's,
legislation became necessary to protect participants. Congressional investigations disclosed looting and mishandling of pension funds, and the worst
abuses concerned the following insurance practices: kickbacks in the form of
exorbitant commissions to agents controlling a plan to achieve its adoption;
excessive administration fees; discrimination between policyholders; and
embezzlement of premiums, occasionally in a conspiracy with administrative
officials. 30
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 195831 was the outgrowth of these studies. Congress considered the best way to prevent these
abuses was complete disclosure and reporting to beneficiaries, participants,
and the Secretary of Labor of financial and other information concerning the
plans. However, only limited reporting was actually required, and the Act
failed to provide necessary enforcement and investigative powers. Its effectiveness was to be determined by the fortuitous policing that might emanate
from plan beneficiaries. Because of this lack of power, at least one-third of
32
covered plans failed to file descriptions and reports.
25. CABINET COMMITTEE REPORT 11.
26. 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
27. 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
28. 61 Stat. 136, 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §186 (1964).
29. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949); Inland Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 77 N.L.R.B. 4 (1947).
30. S. Rep. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11 (1958).
31. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C. §§301-09 (1964).
32. Comment, The Report of the President's Cabinet Committee on Private Pension
Plan Regulation: An Appraisal, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1258, 1260 (1965).
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This early legislation was fortified by the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, giving the Secretary of Labor authority
to issue rules and regulations, conduct investigations, and secure injunctive
compliance with the Act. Bonding of fiduciaries was required, and offering,
accepting or soliciting bribes or kickbacks in connection with establishing a
,plan, embezzlement of funds, and knowingly making false reports were made
federal offenses.3 3 Although the Act was considerably strengthened by these
amendments, it still remains primarily a device for gathering information.
Another tool for gathering information concerning union administered
pension trusts was provided by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.34 The provisions of this Act overlap in some measure
those of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, although only concerning large union retirement plans. Annual reports regarding investments,
employee benefits, and the like are required. The primary informationgathering device still remains the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
The regulation of the scope and operation of private retirement systems
is found in the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations.5 Although the
threat of criminal prosecution provides a deterrent for pension abuses, the
only effective enforcement lies in the power of the Internal Revenue Service
to grant or disallow the "qualified" status of a pension plan. Qualification
of a plan is generally desirable because of the tax advantages to both employer
and employee.-6 The employers' contributions to the plan are not taxed to
employees when made, but only upon distribution, and then are granted
long-term capital gain treatment for certain lump sum distributions, or are
taxed at annuity rates when the employees' income is usually lower. 37 Earnings
accumulated by the pension plan remain free of tax until distributed. 8
Contributions are generally deductible as business expenses in the year in
which they accrued or made.39 On the other hand, employer contributions to nonqualified plans are only deductible when accrued or made to the
extent that employee rights are vested, and these payments are then taxed
to the employees. 40
The requirements for qualification of a plan are minimal. General
standards are set forth in section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 as follows: there must be a written contract, trust, or other binding
instrument creating the plan, which must be a permanent program, communicated to the employees; the plan must be for the exclusive benefit of the
employees or their beneficiaries, and it must be impossible to divert any part
of the corpus or income to any other purpose before satisfaction of all
liabilities;41 the plan must benefit employees in general and not just a limited
33. 76 Stat. 35 (1962).
34. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §401 (1964).

85.

INT. RPrv. CODE OF 1954, § §401-04, 501-04.

36. CBn=r CoMMrrrEE REPORT 3.
87. INT. Rzv. CoDE of 1954, § §402 (a) (1) (2), 403 (a) (1).
38. Nr. RiEv. CODE of 1954, §501 (a).
39. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §404 (a).
40. CABnrr COMMITTEE REPORT 3.
41. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §401 (a) (2).
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number. To meet this last requirement, 80 per cent or more of all employees
with five years of service must be included, in the event that 70 per cent or
more of all employees are eligible for coverage, or, if less than the prescribed
percentage are participants, the eligibility classification must not discriminate
in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or supervisors. Once the
plan is in effect, there must be no discrimination in favor of this latter group
in eligibility, contributions, or benefits. Variations in contrbutions are permissible so long as the plan in its over-all operation does not discriminate
in favor of the group mentioned. Contributions or benefits based on compensation excluded from the OASI wage base may differ from contributions
or benefits within such wage base as long as the differences are offset by
benefits available under Social Security on a percentage basis. Such a plan
2
is considered integrated with OASI.4
The regulatory requirements of the Internal Revenue Code are concerned
with plans being used solely for employees, that employees will receive the
benefits from contributions, and that the tax incentives will not provide
an opportunity for discriminatory bonanzas favoring managerial personnel
or corporate shareholders. Policy decisions regarding benefits and administration, as well as investment of trust funds, have been left to the employer's
discretion.
Report of the President's Committee
Pressures emanating from crosscurrents in private pensions, together with
problems inherent in the size of an institution responsible for the welfare and
financial stability of a major segment of the American population, led the
President to appoint a committee on March 28, 1962, to review legislation
and administrative practices relating to corporate pension funds and other
private retirement and welfare programs. The committee was composed of
Secretaries of Labor; Treasury; and Health, Education and Welfare, as well
as the Director of the Budget; Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors;
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission - hence its name,
the "Cabinet Committee." After submitting a preliminary report late in
1962 to the President's Labor-Management Advisory Committee, the final
report was made public in January 1965.43 The findings and recommendations

of the committee have spearheaded government interest in widespread reform
of many aspects of private retirement.
The report of the President's Cabinet Committee is summarized in topical
outline fashion. 44 An understanding of its conclusions are necessary as background material for current efforts to solve any problems in private pensions.
The size of the private retirement system, emphasized by President Johnson as reason enough to provide regulatory legislation, 45 will increase rapidly
42.

See generally E. WOOD, J. CERNY

&

H. RAFUSE, TAX AsPEcs OF DEmRRED CoM-

PENSATION 12-36 (1965).
43. CABINEr COMMrrrEE REPORT.

44. Id. at vi-xvi.
45. 113 CONG. REC. H 1407 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967).
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in the next decade. By 1980, total contributions are expected to rise to $11
billion a year, and benefit payments will amount to $9 billion annually. The
number of beneficiaries will increase to about 6.5 million, and total reserves
will grow to approximately $225 billion. It is little wonder that the private
retirement system is regarded as a major element in the economic security
of American workers, representing a source of financial power and having a
significant impact on manpower in our economy.
The OASI program is viewed as remaining the base for assuring adequate
retirement income to workers and their dependents. Private pensions act as
a supplement to the public system. This social purpose provides justification
for the indirect subsidy derived from favorable tax treatment. The committee recommended that public policy continue to encourage the growth of
private retirement and improve the basic soundness and equitable character
of the plans. Private pensions will never replace the public system, but as
assured supplementary benefits they can provide retirement incomes reasonably related to living standards in the economy.
One of the most serious problems facing the private pension system is
the effect of retirement plans on labor mobility. Seniority and other benefits
based on length of service, together with pension expectations, tend to reduce
manpower mobility by tying workers to a particular employer. Rapid technological changes in our economy indicate a need for a mobile labor force.
The older worker, in addition to being relatively stationary, is the victim
of discrimination in employment, in part because of pension costs. The
committee recommended flexibility in the administration of the private pension system and emphasized that compulsory earlier retirement is not suitable
as a means of dealing with unemployment.
Present law does not impose any minimum standards of vesting for
employees of other than the self-employed. 46 The committee viewed the
problem of vesting of benefits after reasonable service and to enhance
mobility in the work force. A reasonable measure of vesting will strengthen
the economic security of the retired worker and justify private pensions'
favored tax status on the ground of broad social purpose. The committee
recommended a system of graded deferred vesting based solely upon length
of service for both single and multiemployer 47 plans.
Funding was viewed by the committee as inadequately safeguarded by
existing law, and which could result in the complete or partial failure of
employees to receive pension benefits. Recommendations for legislation in
this area where minimum standards for stated benefit and fixed contribution
plans, initial actuarial certification and periodic review, and minimum guidelines or ranges of standards with respect to actuarial assumptions. Regular
audits of pension fund assets and an appropriate transition period to absorb
additional costs were also recommended.
The committee made no specfic legislative suggestions in the areas of
portability and reinsurance, which are devices transferring accumulated
46. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §401 (d) (e), as amended 80 Stat. 1539 (1966).
47. For a discussion of multiemployer plans see text accompanying notes 83-86.
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pension credits and guaranteeing benefits in the event of certain terminations.
Both of these proposals are related to vesting and funding recommendations.
Tax laws, while giving encouragement to the growth of private retirement, have also conferred some benefits, which the committee felt were
unwarranted, and continued some practices that did not reflect its concept of
public policy. The committee recommended that:
(a) the option to establish plans for salaried or clerical employees
only should be eliminated;
(b) the period of deferred coverage for any employee should be
lowered from five to three years;
(c) employees of tax-exempt institutions should receive favored tax
treatment only if their plans qualify under rules applicable to taxable
employers;
(d) some limitation on benefits and contributions should be required;
(e) credit to the employer should be limited to no more than onehalf the OASI benefit;
(f) capital gains treatment of lump sum distributions should be
replaced with income averaging;
(g) the exemption from taxation of the increase in value of employer
securities upon distribution should be eliminated;
(h) gift and estate taxes should apply to transfers of interests in
qualified plans in the same manner as to other interests in property; and
(i) profit-sharing plans should be included in implementation of the
committee's vesting recommendations.
The committee also suggested an appropriate transition period and special procedures where costs would be substantially increased by its proposals.
Although it noted the existence of problems, the committee had no
program in several areas. For investments of pension funds, no conformity
to any prescribed rule respecting the proportion of stocks to other investments was suggested. No new standards of fiduciary responsibility were proposed, although the committee felt that there appeared to be a need for
strengthened statutory provisions assuring compliance. No regulatory agency
was suggested as a guardian of the interests of employees and their beneficiaries. The committee did, however, recommend a maximum limitation on
the portion of a retirement fund that may be invested in the stock or obligations of the employer company and suggested that additional information
be supplied under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
In the three and one-half years48 following the publication of the report
of the President's Committee, much consideration has been given to its
49
recommendations. A number of bills have been introduced in Congress,
48.

Research for this study was concluded in October 1968.

49. S. 1103, introduced by Senator Javits, covers vesting, funding, portability, and
reinsurance. Some others include H.R. 4462, introduced by Representative Dingell, covering
portability and vesting and H.R. 686 introduced by Representative Holland and its corn-
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and extensive hearings have taken place, at which committees, governmental
agencies, representatives of labor and management, and knowledgeable commentators in the field of private retirement have made their views known.
Not all of its recommendations will become law, and of those that are accepted
by Congress the earliest will be enacted in 1969.
The most urgent pension issues facing Congress in the future will be
those concerning mandatory vesting, minimum funding, reinsuring pension
benefits, increasing fiduciary responsibility, and broadening and enlarging
Social Security. A program of legislative reform of our existing private retirement system has begun. This study will consider the major problems
facing Congress and the Treasury concerning vesting, funding, and integration against the background of the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee, review pending legislation, and will suggest proposed solutions.
VESTING AND LABOR MOBILrrY

One of the more controversial recommendations made by the Cabinet
Committee concerns a minimum vesting requirement. "Vesting" has been
defined as a guarantee to the worker of a right or equity in a pension plan
based upon all or part of his accrued retirement benefits should his employment terminate before he becomes eligible for retirement. 50 The term "vesting" is not normally applied to the benefits purchased by the employee's own
contributions since he is entitled to the return of his own contributions on
51
withdrawal from the plan.
Three types of vesting are found in pension plans, distinguished by the
requirements the worker must fulfill to achieve a vested position. Under
deferred full vesting, eligible workers retain a right to all accrued benefits
upon meeting the specified requirements, such as age 40 and 10 years of
service. Under deferred graded vesting, workers acquire a right to a certain
percentage of accrued benefits upon fulfilling the requirements, with the
percentage increasing as additional requirements are met, until fully vested.
For example, there may be 50 per cent vesting on completing ten years of
service, with an additional 10 per cent for each additional year, up to 100
per cent for fifteen years or more of service. Immediate full vesting is the
third type, under which all benefits are fully vested as soon as they are
earned.52
Although the concept and use of vesting provisions in pension plans is
not new, actual incorporation into plans has been limited until recent years,
especially in noncontributory and collectively-bargained pension plans. In
panion, S. 1635, introduced by Senator Hartke, covering reinsurance. The Yarborough-Perkins
bill, S. 1024 and H.R. 5741, covers disdosure and limits investment in employer stock. In 1968
the Labor Department sponsored the "Pension Benefit Security Act," S. 8421 and H.R. 17046,
providing for mandatory vesting, funding, and plan termination insurance and generally
implemeting the Cabinet Committee's Report.
50. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 1407, LABOR MOBILITY
AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 11 (1964).
51. CABINET CoMmrrrE REPORT 33.
52.

U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTIcS, supra note 50, at 14.
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1952, only 25 per cent of the plans reviewed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
53
contained any vesting provisions, of which three-fourths were contributory.
By the early 1960's the Bureau reported that vesting was provided by two
out of three private pension plans, covering three out of five workers. Vesting was reported to be more common in single employer plans than in multiemployer plans, with about seven out of ten single employer plans (covering
about the same proportion of workers) having vesting, as compared with
about one out of three multiemployer plans (covering about one out of four
workers) having vesting. Nearly 80 per cent of the workers covered by contributory plans had vesting provisions, as compared with 55 per cent of
54
workers in noncontributory plans.
Vested retirement benefits are a valuable asset to a worker. The worth
of the median vested benefit to a 3,600 dollar-a-year worker with 10 years
service would be 1,662 dollars if purchased at age 45, or 3,550 dollars if purchased at age 65. The 8,400 dollar-a-year worker with 30 years service would
have gained an asset valued at 11,238 dollars if the median benefit were
purchased at age 45, or 23,998 dollars if purchased at age 65. As might be
expected, vested benefits vary widely at different service and earnings levels.
For the middle 80 per cent of workers earning 4,800 dollars with 20 years
service, the range was 38 dollars to 105 dollars per month. At the 8,400 dollar
level, with the same length of service, the range was 48 dollars to 219 dollars
per month. 55
Few plans contain only the two benefits of normal retirement and some
form of vesting. Other major benefits such as disability and early retirement
protect the worker in different situations. However, one benefit is seldom a
complete substitute for another.
Private initiative and collective bargaining have led to a wide variety
of plan provisions. Unions usually are more interested in normal retirement
benefits at the inception of a plan. Costs are, of course, one vital factor
in pension planning decisions.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics analyzed major benefits in a large group
of plans and reported that at least one of such benefits was found in most
plans. 56 In almost one-tenth of the plans, with one-tenth of the workers,
normal retirement age had to be reached before a worker received any plan
benefits. In contrast, 30 per cent of the plans with 40 per cent of the workers
provided all three major benefits that supplement normal retirement. However, in two-fifths of the plans with 20 per cent of the workers, a disabled
worker had to substitute early retirement or vesting for disability retirement.
The following table illustrates the distribution of these major benefits.

53.

U.S.

BUREAU

54. U.S.
55. U.S.

No. 1147, PENSION PLANS
(1953) studied 300 large collectively bargained pension plans.

OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL.

UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

supra note 50, at 12.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTICS,

DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No.

1485,

PRIVATE PENSION

86 (1966).
Id. at 88.

PLAN BENEFrrs

56.
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TABLE 5
Major Benefits Provided in Addition to Normal Retirements7
Per cent

All plans studied
No other benefit
Disability, early retirement, and vesting
Disability and early retirement
Disability and vesting

Disability only
Early retirement and vesting
Early retirement only
Vesting only

Plans

Workers

100.0

100.0
10.0
39.1
17.2
4.9

9.4
30.9
9.9
6.0

5.0
27.3
8.5

8.5
14.4
4.7
1.1

3.1

Requirements for Vesting
With the rare exception of plans with immediate full vesting, most plans
impose conditions on qualification for vested benefits. The most common
form of vesting, deferred full vesting, requires substantial periods of service
as well as minimum age levels. Ten years of service or less was needed for
deferred full vesting by about 45 per cent of the plans covering the same
fraction of workers. Over one-half the plans with about the same proportion
of workers required 15 or more years of service. Minimum service requirements are shown in the following table.
TABLE 6
Minimum Service Requirements5s
Per cent
Minimum Service

Plans

Workers

All plans with deferred full vesting

100.0

100.0

No service requirement
Less than 10 years
10 years
11-14 years

0.2
17.5
24.8
3.3

0.2
7.7
372
2.6

15 years

30.5

37.3

16-19 years
20 years
21-24 years

1.2
13.8
02

1.0
8.1
0.4

25 years
26-29 years
30 years

7.6
0.4
0.4

4.0
0.3
0.4

In addition to length of service requirements, minimum age levels were
required by 70 per cent of the plans with the same fraction of workers.
Age 40 was required by about 25 per cent of the plans covering over 45 per
cent of workers studied. Minimum age requirements are illustrated in Table 7.
57.

Id.

58. US. BuREAu

OF LABOR STATisrcs,

supra note 50, at 15.
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TABLE 7
Minimum Age Requirements59
Per cent

All plans with deferred full vesting
No age requirement
Age 40 and under
Age 45
Age 50
Age 55
Age 60

Plans

Workers

100.0
30A
27.2
8.8
9.9
20.8
3.0

100.0
29.8
46.2
8.6
8.1
6.5
0.8

The combination if minimum age 40 and 10 or 15 years of service,
found in plans negotiated by the automobile workers and steelworkers or
plans influenced by these provisions, applied to over 40 per cent of workers
having deferred full vesting. Another 30 per cent of workers had no age
requirement, but service requirements of 10 or 15 years were most common.
Generally, service requirements increased where no minimum age was
specified.60
Age and service requirements of pension plans with deferred graded vesting, general union plans, were more varied than those with deferred full
vesting. Workers could qualify for lower initial benefits with less service at
an earlier age than in plans with deferred full vesting, but full vesting under
graded deferred plans generally required longer service than under deferred
full vesting plans. Ten or 15 years was the most common requirement to
achieve initial vesting. The basic percentage varied from 5 per cent at
5 years service to 75 per cent at 10 years, with the most common level reached
at 50 per cent for 10 years service. Fifteen years was required for full vesting
in 85 per cent of the plans. More than one-half of the workers were in plans
with no age requirement, but had service requirements of 15 years or longer.61
Early retirement and vesting are interrelated benefits. Approximately
75 per cent of private pension plans covering three-fourths of the workers
provided for early retirement. This benefit was more prevalent in singleemployer plans than among multiemployer plans and was more common in
contributory plans, in plans not established through collective bargaining,
and in salaried workers' plans.
Length of service requirements for early retirement were comparable to
those for disability retirement. Fifteen years service was the most common
service level, although 10 years were needed in a sixth of the plans covering
25 per cent of the workers. A fourth of the workers needed 20 years or more
2
and a fifth of the workers could qualify with less than 10 years of service.6
Minimum age requirements were most frequently placed at 55 and 60 in
nearly 95 per cent of the plans covering 85 per cent of the workers. Com59. Id.
60. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTiCS, supra note 50, at 15-16.
61. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATiSTICS, supra note 50, at 16.
62. Id. at 25-26.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss2/1

14

Norman: Private Pensions: A Study of Vesting, Fudning, and Integration
1968]

PRIVATE PENSIONS

binations of age 55 and 10 to 15 years service were required for over 20 per
cent of the workers, while another 30 per cent were in plans requiring age
60 and 10 or 15 years service. Employer consent, or request, was a condition
required by nearly 50 per cent of plans covering almost 40 per cent of the
workers.6 s
Disability retirement is akin to vested benefits in the sense of providing
an income supplementary to OASI benefits. However, almost half of the
plans, covering 30 per cent of the workers, provided no disability benefits
whatever. 64
The Bankers Trust Company conducted a series of surveys of industrial
pension plans providing valuable supplementary information concerning the
recent growth of vesting provisions. These studies, conducted at intervals
since 1943, have developed their own illustrative terminology. The term
"pattern plan" refers to a form of plan that has been introduced through
adoption by various international unions and negotiated, with some minor
variations, throughout industry in general. In this type of plan, except in
the steel industry, pensions are in a flat dollar amount, which may vary with
years of service but not with the compensation rate of the employee. The
term "conventional plan" refers to a plan that provides benefits varying both
with years of service and with rates of compensation and that is not of the
65
"pattern" type. Almost all plans adopted prior to 1950 were conventional.
"Full vesting" refers to the whole accrued benefit whether termination is
voluntary or involuntary, and "partial vesting" refers to only a specified
percentage of the accrued benefit, or future service benefits only. The following table demonstrates vesting provisions in "pattern" plans during the
1956-1959 period and the 1960-1965 interval.
TABLE 8

Vesting Provisions for Pattern Plans66

Provisions for Full Vesting

Age 60 after a specified period of credited service
Age 55 after a specified period of credited service
Age 50 after a specified period of credited service
Age 45 after a specified period of credited service
Age 40 after 15 years of credited service
Age 40 after 10 years of credited service
10 years of credited service
Other requirements for full vesting
Plans with only partial vesting
Plans with no vesting

Total

1960-1965
Plans

8%

3
4
6
37
27
10

1956-1959
Plans

10%
10
1
9
21
16
4

3
1
6

8
3
18

100%

100%

63. U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISnCS, supra note 55, at 67-68.
64. Id. at 83.
65. BAmams TRusr COMPANY, 1965 STUDY oF INDUSTRIAL RETIREENT PLANS 7 (1965).
66.

Id. at 19.
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There is a discernible trend toward more liberal vesting in the later
period, particularly at the age 40 and 10 to 15 years service levels. Ninetyfour per cent of all plans during 1960-1965 provided some form of vesting
compared with 82 per cent in the previous period. Table 8 shows not only
the trend toward more liberal requirements, but vesting in a greater number
of plans. Employees aged 40 with 15 years of service fully vest in 75 per
cent of the pattern plans studied in 1960-1965, compared with 42 per cent
in the previous study. Fully 50 per cent of the plans studied in the later
period added or liberalized vesting, while no plan was made more restrictive."
Conventional plans also developed more liberally in vesting during the
same intervals. Ninety-seven per cent of the conventional plans studied provided vesting during 1960-1965, compared with 90 per cent in 1956-1959.
Most conventional plans have enjoyed vesting for some time. At the age 40
and 15 years of service level, 33 per cent of these plans provided vesting in
the later period, compared with 21 per cent in the previous study., s Age
and service requirements are summarized in the following table.
TABLE 9

Vesting Provisions of Conventional Plans69
Provisions for Full Vesting

1960-1965
Plans

Vesting on completion of a period of credited service
10 years or less
12%
15 years
10
8
20 years or more
Vesting on attainment of
Age 55
2
Age 60
1
Vesting on completion of a period of credited service
ranging from 5 years too 25 years or more and attainment of

Age 40 or less
Age 45
Age 50
Age 55
Age 60
Vesting only on layoff
Plans with only partial vesting
Plans with no vesting
Total

1956-1959
Plans

6%
8
10
2
2

12

7

14
13
14
7
1
3
3

11
11
15
11
2
5
10

100%

100%

Vesting and Manpower Policy
The ultimate effectiveness of the vesting provided by the various plans
in effect is, of course, the important aspect of this benefit. Based upon Bureau
of Labor Statistics' surveys, the Cabinet Committee found that the vesting
67. Id.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id.
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provided by most plans was illusory. For example, the prospects of a worker

achieving a vested benefit, or becoming entitled to early retirement, can be
illustrated by considering the hypothetical worker entering a pension plan
at age 25. Ninety per cent of the plans would not give any form of vested
benefit within the first ten years of service, or until age 35. If the employee
remained until age 40, with 15 years of service, over two-thirds of the plans
would still not provide any vested benefits. By age 50, with 25 years of service,
45 per cent of the plans would still not provide vested benefits. Thereafter,
requirements preventing vesting tend to vanish, with vesting becoming almost
universal at age 65.70
Even with an evident trend toward more universal vesting of pension
benefits without governmental intervention, as illustrated by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' and Bankers Trust Company's surveys, the Cabinet Committee
considered vesting to be of such prime importance that it did not want the
decision of indusion or exclusion of vesting provisions to be made by
private parties and proposed a minimum vesting provision be included as a
prerequisite to qualification for favorable tax treatment. As a minimum
requirement, deferred graded vesting, with 50 per cent after 15 years and
full vesting after 20 years was recommended."'
Vesting is probably one of the most meaningful aspects of pension coverage. To understand the significance of the Cabinet Committee's proposal
in this area, it is necessary to examine union, management, and public policy
factors in the pension system.
The union concept of the function of pensions is that employees earn
the right to receive pension benefits because they are working for reduced
compensation in order to acquire these deferred benefits. In addition, the
human depreciation concept would require all industry, in the absence of
adequate governmental programs, to fulfill an obligation to workers to provide
for their maintenance after their active working careers have been concluded.72 Pension plans without vesting provisions often deny the employee
his "deferred wages," leave him without adequate income in retirement, and
impair his mobility by tying workers to the job in which pension credits
would be lost if employment is terminated.
Management, on the other hand, contends that private pension plans
had their origins in retaining valuable workers, in reducing labor turnover
and its attendant costs, and in rewarding long service. These business
reasons for providing retirement benefits are still alive.78 It seems that there
should be some middle ground between union and management views.
Governmental interests in vesting stems from a diversity of reasons: as a
matter of equity and fair treatment, an employee covered by a pension plan
is entitled, after reasonable service, to protection of his retirement benefit
against termination of employment; vesting fulfills the concept that the
worker earns deferred wages in employer contributions to a pension plan;
70. CABw-Er CoMMrrEE REPoRT 39.
71. Id. at 42. See also Comment, supra note
72.

73.

32, at 1268.

D. McGmy, supra note 8, at 17-19.
CABiNrr COMMrrrEE REPORT 1.
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and workers who voluntarily or involuntarily terminate employment after
long service retain pension rights. Vesting also enables employers to eliminate
employee discontent with pensions and provides an additional fringe benefit
with which to attract personnel. By providing widely available retirement
benefits, vesting strengthens the nation's retirement program, making benefits
available to a greater number of workers and enhancing the security function
of the private pension system. Labor mobility is a vital manpower factor,
and the labor system functions with the workers' freedom to change jobs to
parts of the economy where services can be utilized. A lack of vesting may
not be a major deterrent to mobility, but it does inhibit movement in
important segments of the labor force such as professional, technical, whitecollar, and some manual workers. The deterrent effect of a lack of vesting
may become more of a future problem as more employees are covered by
pension plans.

7
4

The effect of vesting upon labor mobility is significantly different in the
three types of vesting. Immediate full vesting offers the maximum protection of pension rights, accordingly most strongly supports mobility, but
is by far the costliest method of vesting. It also assures benefits for workers
with little service, which is not one of the basic pension tenets. In fact, its
infrequent use is attributable to these two factors.
The most common form of vesting, deferred full vesting, guarantees a
worker meeting the requirements for his full accrued benefits. If he terminates employment, after meeting the vesting requisites, he stands to lose future
accruals of benefits, usually at higher levels, but this is only one factor to
be considered in changing employment. Under deferred full vesting, where
there is a point of time when the worker becomes fully vested, the "locked-in"
effect of this type of vesting is greater than under deferred graded vesting
where the worker is gradually entitled to a full vesting of benefits.
The grading of vesting over a period of service concurs with the traditional pension concept of rewarding long continuous service and tends to
reduce the costs of vesting, making it more attractive to employers. Of course,
excessive service requirements would nullify the benefits to labor mobility
that may be achieved.

75

The largest group changing employment in any given year is under 25
years of age. Thereafter, the number of employment changes made voluntarily decreases rapidly with age. In addition to the effect of technological
changes, accumulated benefits such as seniority, security, and other fringe
emoluments weigh heavily in favor of job retention for older workers.
Workers holding jobs for short periods may, however, retain mobility through6
out their working lives.7

High age and long service requirements in vesting benefits counteract the
mobility potential of vesting. However, service requirements are not usually
so great as to negate vesting's positive effect on potential mobility. Approximately 45 per cent of workers in plans with vesting need complete 10 or fewer
74.
75.

76.

Id. at 39-40.
U.S. BuREAu OF LAEOR STATIsTICS, supra note 50, at 22.
Goldworn, supra note 10, at 247.
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years of service to qualify and an additional 40 per cent participate in plans
requiring between 11 and 15 years. The key element for mobility is usually
the age requirement for vesting, generally 40 years or more. The 10-year
service requirement in many plans may not be as significant a restriction as
the attainment of age 40. Moreover, plans that require the attainment of
ages 45, 50, or 55 may effectively deny vesting and hence impair mobility
for workers with as much as 15 years or more of serviceY7
Involuntary separations must be considered apart from normal vesting
provisions. Since such vesting operates beyond the control of the worker,
even though protecting the separated worker meeting age and service requirements, the contribution to voluntary mobility is negligible.78
Exhaustive as the Cabinet Committee's analysis of vesting as it affects
labor mobility may have been, a general conclusion that lack of vesting
inhibits worker mobility may not be justified. Indeed, the committee suggests that a limited and selective effect upon mobility is observed. Caution
must be employed in evaluating this factor as a justification for mandatory
vesting. 79 Other social reasons, such as retirement security, for a higher
quality of vesting may be more important.
Costs are the basic deterrent to immediate expansion of vesting provisions. The interplay of various factors makes this area one of the most important in any consideration of vesting, together with collective bargaining
and portability.
Vesting Costs and Other Considerations
One of the most troublesome aspects of the Cabinet Committee's recommendations for mandatory vesting is the difficulty of accurately predicting the
cost of providing vested benefits. The variety of plans in many diverse industries having different turnover experiences makes this area almost speculative.
Without better information it will be difficult to draft meaningful legislation.
The committee's findings relative to the cost of vesting indicate the
lowest expense to plans that now meet one or more of the suggested standards.
Two-thirds of the plans fit into this category, and amending them to conform
to the suggested graded deferred vesting (50 per cent after 15 years, full
vesting after 20 years) will not involve excessive cost. Many plans now condition full vesting upon the attainment of age 40, and eliminating this
requirement would not greatly increase cost because relatively few workers
withdrawing before age 40 are apt to have more than 15 years of service.
The committee also believed that plans limiting vesting to involuntarily
separated workers would incur a small increase in vesting benefits of voluntarily terminated workers, since voluntary withdrawal among workers with
15 years of service would probably be infrequent. This limitation may not be
desirable in periods of recession.
Obviously, the largest cost increase will occur in providing vesting for
those plans that do not presently provide this benefit. Estimates by the
77. U.S. BuaRAu oF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 22-23.
78. Id.
79. Goldworn, supra note 10, at 249.
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committee, covering all but a small percentage of plans, indicated that
deferred full vesting after 20 years of service (including premembership
service) would not add more than 6 per cent to the cost of providing normal
retirement benefits at 65 years of age, and that the deferred grading of
vested benefits, recommended by the committee, would seldom add more
than 8 per cent. The basis for these estimates has not been clearly stated.
Multiemployer plans without vesting, the most numerous of the type
of plan without this benefit, have different factors for consideration since
the problem does not relate to all terminating employees but only those
leaving the coverage of the plan as a whole. Higher numbers of participants
in such plans are likely to attain the 15 years of service needed to qualify
for vesting, and small proportions of these workers are likely to withdraw
from the plans after 15 years and before retirement. In union plans, the
need to remain a dues-paying member until retirement may place an unwarranted burden upon workers.
The committee concluded that adopting its basic recommendations regarding vesting would increase costs by 5 per cent for a large majority of
the plans and rarely would it exceed 10 per cent.8 0 Again, the computations
for these cost estimates were not published.
Graded deferred vesting has been found to be more financially manageable than full vesting with the same basic qualifications. However, as
in full vesting, to reduce cost there is a tendency to place the initial
period required for vesting just above the length of service achieved
by most employees. For short-term employees, graded vesting has no advantage over deferred full vesting unless the initial qualifying period is
shorter than it would be under a full vesting formula. Graded vesting,
whatever its shortcomings, seems to indicate progress toward more effective
benefit coverage."' It is hard to oppose this approach to effective retirement
planning if costs can be reasonably ascertained.
Studies comparing hypothetical cost relationships for selected vesting
provisions have determined that graded deferred vesting confers the most
benefits at the least cost. Immediate full vesting is obviously the most expensive method and, considering employer motivation to provide pensions, may be completely unworkable. Combinations of ages, 40, 45,
and so on with 10 or 15 years of service are noticeably less expensive
than the straight 10- or 15-year conditions. Graded vesting providing 50
per cent of normal retirement benefits after 10 years of service, and 10 per
cent per year thereafter, would be less costly than deferred full vesting after
10 years. One conclusion, however, is obvious: the more liberally a vesting
formula protects employee benefits, the more expensive the formula is.
Obviously, the costs of different vesting provisions will vary with the particular circumstances of each plan or employee situation.2
Closely related to vesting is the transferability of pension credits from
one pension plan to another, called "portability." Multiemployer plans
80.

CABINET COMMITrEE REPORT 45-46.

81.

M. BERNSTEIN, THE FuTuRE oF PRIVATE PENSIONS 250-51 (1964).

82.

Id. at 250-52.
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provide the closest approach to full portability of pension credits. Multiemployer plans are generally of two types, industry-wide plans and area or
geographical multiemployer plans. Created out of existing multiemployer
collective bargaining arrangements, these plans have taken their place among
other uniform conditions of employment and accommodate the ability of
workers to shift from one employer to another within the bargaining unit.
Such plans cover about three-fifths of the workers under multiemployer collective bargaining and are relatively young. Less than 10 per cent of the
plans were established before 1950 and, with a spurt after 1954, 60 per cent
of the plans were less than 6 years old in 1960.3 Such plans generally are
lacking in vesting and early retirement benefits. Portability of pension
credits, the distinguishing characteristic of multiemployer plans, means that
the worker remains covered and continues to accrue service credits as long,
as he is employed by one of the participating employers. Reciprocity between
plans provides additional portability. However, only about 10 per cent of
the plans have these arrangements and these rarely cover pensions established
by different unions. On the other hand, about a fourth of the workers
covered by multiemployer plans are covered by reciprocal arrangements, and
a large portion of these workers were under International Ladies' Garment
Workers' plans, which operate as a large pension plan covering nearly all
union members.
Multiemployer plans were developed in industries where employees typically shift from one employer to another. Portability of pension benefits,
84
therefore, evolved as a natural feature of these plans.
As many single employer plans originated, at least in part, from the
employer's desire to encourage workers to stay with the company until
retirement, the growth of vesting and early retirement provisions represents
a substantial erosion of that purpose. Similarly, the growth of multiemployer
plans, while not necessarily motivated by the desire to hold workers, is related
to the desire to conserve the labor force on the part of management and
on the part of the union to preserve its membership. Union requirements
may be more stringent than economic conditions warrant. A tendency to
increase mobility by increasing vesting and early retirement would relax
the ties holding the worker to the multiemployer group. This result is far
less significant if the muliemployer plans cover all jobs in an industry or
occupation since, in many instances, the worker is already bound to the
employer group by the specialized nature of his training. Such workers have
a traditional tendency to cling to their trades and markets even when the
likelihood of steady employment is not present. A lack of vesting and early
retirement may reinforce this inclination. Muldemployer pension plans may
tend to immobilize the unemployed, especially those workers with a large
stake in the plan. The larger the benefits provided, the greater its potential
influence on a decision to leave its shelter.8 5 The shelter can become illusory
if remaining under its protection is expensive.
83. US.

BREuAu OF LABOR STATSTIcs,

supra note 50, at 36.

84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 40.
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Although multiemployer plans, through their general lack of vesting
and early retirement provisions, may tend to discourage voluntary movement
outside the plan, it is probable that a higher proportion of workers in such
plans expect to spend their working lives within its scope. The chief immobilizing effect may then be to hold workers to a declining industry or craft
at a time when voluntary changes are desirable. An increase in vesting and
early retirement benefits should serve to offset this tendency.86 This outcome
would be highly desirable.
The Cabinet Committee recommended a study of portability for single
employer plans to handle fragments of vested benefits accrued under different
employers. Although no specific legislation was recommended, the committee suggested several possible methods of approaching this problem. A
central clearinghouse or other institutional arrangement for transferring
and accumulating private pension credits, perhaps through the machinery of
the OASI system, was suggested to provide record keeping, greater portability,
consolidation of pension credits, and promotion of wider coverage of small
firms. In addition to suggesting a central private pension fund for small
employers, an option of an employer voluntarily to contribute vested benefits
upon separation to a special fund, was also recommended for study. This
option would free the employer from keeping records and paying small
benefits after retirement. Such contributions might be combined in computing total supplementary benefits for a worker. 87
A major problem in the fragmentation of vested rights occurs because
of the fixed dollar amounts of deferred benefits. When an employee is
separated with vested rights, the amount of the benefit is determined by the
formula in use at that time and is expressed in a fixed sum-with the
exception of the use of a variable annuity for all or part of the benefit.
If a great amount of time elapses between vesting and retirement, the value
of the benefit is subject to considerable erosion. Inflation during the last
20 years amply illustrates the vulnerability of a deferred fixed benefit.
Benefit improvements, caused by favorable earnings, increased wages, collective bargaining, and inflation do not apply to employees already separated with vested rights. Vesting, as presently conceived, is aptly labeled
"cold storage" vesting. Benefits, geared to conservative rates of assumed
interest and earnings, are indeed frozen as of separation. Such employees
are not permitted to participate in the benefits that they generate.8 8 Any plan
to administer vested benfits should equitably consider an increment for favorable earnings, as an offset for inflation, if not for increases in wages and
other fringe benefits. Current inflationary tendencies may render fixed benefits greatly inadequate.
Proposed Legislation
Proposed legislation requiring mandated vesting for tax qualifiication
is already before Congress and undergoing extensive committee hearings.
86. Id. at 50.
87. CABINET COMMITrEE REPoRT 55-57.
88. M. BRNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 258-59.
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The earliest date for enactment of any legislation appears to be in 1969.89
Under present law, there is no specific requirement that a pension plan
contain vesting provisions other than the provision that vesting must
occur upon attainment of normal retirement.90 Nevertheless, the Service has
guarded vesting provisions closely to prevent prohibited discrimination in
favor of the managerial group. No general rule seems applicable, and the
facts in each case determine whether the specific vesting provision contains
the element of discrimination. This observation is particularly true for small,
noncollectively bargained pension plans. For example, a pension plan that
allows no vesting until retirement where most of the participants are migratory will not qualify. 91 In most situations where lower-paid employees rarely
stay until retirement, some form of vesting after a reasonable period of
service or participation may be required in order to avoid a discriminatory
92
result.
Full vesting is also required upon termination of a plan or upon the
complete discontinuance of contributions. A company with a large turnover experience may obtain tax qualification if vesting is provided after "a
reasonable waiting period."9 A qualified plan may provide for discontinuance of benefits to a retired employee for cause that must be distinctly
specified such as, taking a position with a competitor of the employer,
divulging the employer's trade secrets to competitors, or for the suspension of
benefits for any period of time during which primary insurance benefits under
the Social Security Act are discontinued because of employment after retirement. Provision may also be made for the granting of less liberal benefits under
such circumstances. However, no provisions may discriminate in favor of
94
employees who are officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated.
There are also basic vesting differences between pension and profitsharing plans. While vesting is not required until retirement, or to prevent
discrimination, or upon termination in a pension plan, under the usual
type of profit-sharing plan an employee acquires a 10 per cent vested right
in his interest annually from the date he becomes a member of the plan, thus
requiring 10 years to achieve 100 per cent vesting. Notwithstanding a lack of
specific legislative authority, District Directors have administratively required
profit-sharing benefits to vest within 5 years in some cases. There is no
indication that this constituted an abuse of discretion. There appears to be
a disparity among districts in this regard and in the treatment accorded
different plans within the same district. Employees terminating employment under a profit-sharing plan are entitled to receive their vested benefits,
89. S.1103 and H.R. 4462, supra note 49, introduced in 1967, have been followed in
1968 by S. 3421, introduced by Senator Yarborough on May 2, as well as H.R. 13544, which
closely parallels Senator Javits' S. 1103.
90. Rev. Rul. 57-163, pt. 5(b) (2), 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 128, 147. See also Goldworn,
supra note 10, at 246.
91. E. WooD, J. CmXNy & H. RAFsE, supra note 42, at 29.
92. TAXATION or DEFERRm EMPLoYEE AND ExEcuTvE COMPENSATION 222 (Sellin ed.
1960).
93. P.S. No. 22, Sept. 2, 1944; Rev. RuL. 65-178, 1965-2 CuM. BuLL. 94, 120.
94. Rev. Rul. 82, 1953-1 CUM. BuLL. 288; Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 CuM. BuLL. 94, at 120.
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the nonvested balance being reallocated to participating employees who continue their employment. Payment of vested amounts may be deferred until
the terminated employee reaches retirement age, although this deferment
requires administrative effort in keeping track of the worker until retirement.
In comparison, under a pension plan, terminating employees forfeit nonvested benefits other than their own contributions plus interest. Generally
speaking, much shorter vesting will be required in profit-sharing plans as
compared with pension plans. 95
In the District of Florida, a rule of thumb for pension vesting has been
10 per cent per year after the first 3 to 5 years depending upon each case, the
turnover rate, type of employees, and other factors. Less vesting may also
be accepted in union plans. The standard applied appears to be whatever
vesting the Service feels is required to prevent the prohibited group from
acquiring all the benefits. If forfeitures will inure to the benefit of the
prohibited group, faster vesting will be required. 96
The rule requiring vesting on termination presents no problem in a
profit-sharing plan. Distribution or continuation of the trust as a qualified
trust, if the termination were justifiable, are alternatives. Similarly, no
complications would be found in termination-vesting in a pension plan
funded by individual annuity policies. In the case of a trusteed-pension plan,
97
where participants have no vested rights at termination, problems do arise.
A dying enterprise often will discharge its employees before it finally goes
under. In many such cases, the employees thus terminated will not satisfy
the normal, early retirement or vested benefit requirements. In an attempt
to salvage some benefits for these workers, Revenue rulings have created
the vesting on termination rule, that is, the normal eligibility requirements
are eliminated. 9 Liability to pay for such benefits is limited to existing
plan resources. However, unless "termination" occurs, and occurs early in
the process of decline, many of the separated employees may not benefit
from it.99
An address by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Surrey in mid-1967
described some staff proposals under consideration by the Administration in
regard to mandatory vesting. 100 These are not yet official proposals. The
staff proposals regarding vesting were premised upon the conclusion that
vesting of pension benefits is a desirable and needed part of the private
retirement system. Secretary Surrey reported little genuine disagreement
with the principal of vesting. This conclusion may not be entirely without
dispute. The idea of deferred full vesting may have almost universal accept95. E. Woon, J. CERNY Se H. RAFUSE, supra note 42, at 5-6.
96. Group interview with Carroll Gilbert, Pension Reviewer, Audit Division, Internal
Revenue Service, in Miami, Florida, Dec. 1, 1965.
97. TAXATION oF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXEcUTIVE COMPENSATION 244-45 (Sellin
ed. 1960).
98. Rev. Rul. 61-157, pt. 5 (c) (2), 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 67, 88.
99. Treas. Reg. §IA01-6(c) (1963); Bernstein, Private Pension Eligibility: Some Problems and Proposals, 13 PRAc. LAW. No. 1, at 77, 89 (1967).
100. Address by Stanley S. Surrey, Ass't Secretary of the Treasury, American Pension
Conference in New York City, May 11, 1967, in P-H PENSION & PRoFrr-SHARING RaP. §15,112.
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ance, while immediate full vesting would be universally opposed. Graded
deferred vesting really hinges on accurate cost estimates.
The mechanics of a vesting standard and the mode of transition are the
primary vesting issues. The Treasury proposed a form of deferred graded
vesting in which vested rights would be granted after 10 years of service. The
10-year period would generally begin to run at the time of initial employment.
In order not to require vesting of small benefits, an employee's service before
age 25 could be disregarded if not taken into account under the pension
plan. The required vesting would apply only to the normal form of benefit,
such as a straight life annuity or a life annuity with a term certain, but not
be applicable to other benefits such as early retirement. The amount of
benefit that should be vested in an employee leaving before retirement age
would be a specific portion of the benefit he would have received at retirement, determined by the ratio of his actual credited service to the credit
service he would have had if employed until retirement age. No minimum
age requirement was recommended. 101
On the matter of a transition to the new vesting standard, the Treasury
proposed a broad rule that would provide that the new vesting standard need
only be applied with respect to benefits for service after the new requirement
goes into effect. That is to say, only benefits for future service-service after
the effective date of the change - need be vested. Service prior to that date
would count toward 10 years required service before vesting.
An additional transition method was also proposed. Because employers
may be unwilling to differentiate between future and past service, since to
do so would not distinguish between long-service and short-service employees,
they may prefer a transition more favorable to long-service workers. Optional
phasing-in of the 10-year vesting standard would be made available under
which it would not become fully applicable until 10 years after the legislation
becomes effective.
One alternative would permit a plan to adopt a 20-year vesting standard
- applicable to the full benefit earned to the date of termination -for
employees who leave during the first year after the legislation becomes
effective and then systematically to reduce this standard so that after 10
years all employees leaving with more than 10 years of employment would
receive vested rights.
Under another alternative, the 10-year standard would apply immediately
but only with respect to a specified percentage of an employee's benefits
depending on when he left the company: if the worker left in the first year
after the effective date of the legislation only 10 per cent of his benefit
1 02
would need be vested; if he left in the second year, 20 per cent; and so on.
Under either of the foregoing alternatives, there would be no distinction
between past and future service benefits, unlike the broad transitional rule.
In any event, no change in plan provisions would be required for the first
2 or 3 years after legislation is enacted in order to allow time for renegotiation of labor contracts. A total transition period would actually be 12 to 13
101. Id. at 15,203.
102. Id. at 15,204.
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years. Thus, the staff proposal does not call for 10-year vesting immediately,
but within 12 or 13 years from the date a bill is enacted.
New plans would not be required to meet any vesting standard for
employees leaving during the first 5 years the plan is in effect. This delay
would recognize that often plans are initially set up to meet the situation
of a few long-service employees nearing retirement age. 10 3 The Treasury
does not seem to have calculated the cost of its proposals, which is a most
important factor.
Proposed legislation, introduced in first session of the 90th Congress to
implement the Cabinet Committee's recommendations, has still not come to
the floor. H.R. 4462 introduced by Representative Dingell would require
that an employee's rights be vested fully after 10 years of employment. The
bill would also set up a special fund to accept deposits of amounts transferred from qualified trusts in settlement of an individual's vested rights
under the plan when his employment is terminated before eligibility for
benefits. If the individual is employed by another employer and covered
under another plan, the amounts credited to his account in the special fund
could be transferred to the plan then covering him. 0 4 The bill has been
referred to the House Ways and Means Committee. 10 5 This legislation
appears entirely too superficial for serious consideration.
Senator Javits introduced a comprehensive bill on pension and profitsharing plans, S. 1103, which provides, inter alia, for full vesting of benefits
at age 45 with 15 years of service. In the alternative, 60 per cent vesting after
10 years of service and 100 per cent vesting after 20 years of service may be
provided. These requirements were minimal, and more liberal vesting could
be adopted. A portability clearinghouse to facilitate the voluntary transfer
of credits between plans having similar benefit features and actuarial assumptions was also included.16
The Senate Finance Committee has not yet
reported on this bill.107 Additional legislation has been introduced in Con-

gress in 1968 covering many aspects of previous bills. The Labor Department's
proposed legislation, S. 342108

and H.R. 17046,109 entitled the "Pension

Benefit Security Act" provides for mandatory vesting for all plans, including
profit sharing, money purchase, and unfunded pension plans. This act
proposes almost universal coverage of all employers, excepting only government administered plans, overseas plans for noncitizens, and H.R. 10 plans.
In regards to plans requiring vesting, the bill necessitates full vesting of
benefits for all employees with 10 or more years of service after age 25. A
plan would be prohibited from having eligibility requirements of an age
higher than 25 or of more than 3 years service. An employee's entire service
would be counted for vesting purposes, except pre-age 25 service, service
during which an employee declined participation in a contributory plan,
103. Id.
104. H.R. 4462, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
105. P-H PENSION & PROFrr-SHARING REP. 15,095.
106. S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
107.

P-H PENSION & PROFrr-SHAIING REP. 115,096.

108. S. 3421, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
109. H.R. 17046, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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service with a predecessor employer unless its plan is continued, and service
that has not been continuous.
All existing plans of 5 years duration or longer would be required to
comply with these minimum vesting standards. Such a plan may vest all
benefits for all employees with 10 years of service, based on service after the
effective date of the bill, vest a rising percentage of benefits for past and
future service 10 per cent the first year after the bill's effective date and 10
per cent per year thereafter, achieving full vesting in the tenth year, or, vest
all accrued benefits on a declining scale, for all employees with 20 or more
years of service in the first year, for all employees with 10 years of service in
the second year, and so on, to reach full vesting for all employees with 10
or more years of service in the tenth year.
Newly established plans would be allowed either to vest all benefits in
the sixth year of operation for employees with 15 or more years of service,
reducing the service requirement by one year each year thereafter, meeting
10 years of vesting in the tenth year or, to vest an increasing percentage of
benefits, 50 per cent for 10 years of service in the sixth year of operation,
60 per cent in the seventh year, reaching 100 per cent in the tenth year.
Enforcement of compliance would be under the Secretary of Labor, a
departure from existing practice, having the approval of the Treasury. The
proposals involved are basically within the field of employer-employee relations and do not include any tax provisions.
The swirling crosscurrents of legislation, proposals and further study have
produced several serious areas of concern for private pensions. From a social
viewpoint, it is hard to take issue with the principle of vesting, but mandatory vesting for all pension plans poses a number of difficulties. First, pension
plans are basically a developing American institution, and they have to
attend to one need and then to another. In their earlier stages of growth
they have given priority to the needs of the older worker, those on the verge
of retirement. This emphasis has been at the temporary expense of vesting
provisions, rapid funding, early retirement, or survivor protection. These
other needs have been gradually met over subsequent periods of improvement.
Requiring all plans to give priority to vesting will tend to displace fulfillment of other basic needs and may also tend to make it more difficult to
establish plans initially. This result is counter to the basic social need to
extend retirement protection. An inflexible order of priority may be created
by mandatory vesting.1' 0 This cannot be as useful as the present system.
Second, the Cabinet Committee's cost estimates are considered by some
observers to be conservative. Without knowing how they were calculated,
they may be unrealistic. The extra cost will have to be borne by the employees
in one way or another, either directly in decreased benefits or as taxpayers.
Reduction of benefits, which would render noncontributory plans contributory, delay of benefit increases that would otherwise have been granted,
termination of marginal plans and stiffling the hitherto healthy growth of
voluntary private retirement plans may result from excessively stringent
110. Tilove, The Adequacy of Private Pension Plans-Another View, N.Y.U.
421, 432 (1966).

18TH
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The committee recognized that mandatory vesting

would serve no useful purpose if it disrupts the existing private pension
system or discourages the establishment of new plans. Yet, recommendations
were made without a complete analysis of the problems involved.
Third, government interference with a marked trend toward voluntary
liberalization of vesting and early retirement will probably interfere with the
bargaining process. The timing and degree of vesting are now negotiated
by the employer, his pensions advisors, the Internal Revenue Service, and
the union, if any. A firm statutory requirement may result in lower benefits
with liberal vesting, a situation inappropriate for certain industries where
112
higher benefits are deemed necessary.
Nevertheless, the consensus among pension observers is that some form
of mandatory vesting is inevitable. In the view of some pessimistic commentators present vesting proposals may be the beginning of immediate
full vesting. It seems obvious that more stringent vesting will have an
immediate effect upon benefits, lowering or retarding increases, especially
for past service benefits. Costs are dependent upon too many variables to
be forecast accurately in blanket percentages. It is to be hoped that further
study will precede the enactment of mandatory vesting.
FUNDING,

REINSURANCE,

AND FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

Additional recommendations have been made by the Cabinet Committee
in the areas of funding, reinsurance, and fiduciary responsibility- all
directed to the end of providing promised pension benefits. The committee
found that pension plans without adequate funding and other safeguards
may turn out to be empty or only partially fulfilled promises. Thus, the
broad social purpose of encouraging the growth of a sound private retirement system as a supplement to Social Security through tax concessions will
fail.113 The committee failed to observe that these promises are either bargained for or granted by the employer - even if assisted by tax incentives.
While funded pension plans were virtually unheard of less than 50 years
ago, they generally have been replaced during the past 20 years with funded
plans among large and medium sized companies. Use of unfunded plans
has been relegated mainly to small concerns, to filling in gaps in funded
1,
plans, and to providing additional compensation for top level executives.1 4

A tax-qualified plan must be a funded plan5 and, accordingly, most recent
growth in private pensions has been in funded plans. Other factors in this
movement to funding are increases in the number of employees being granted
pensions, increased power of labor bargaining units to secure pension benefits,
depression experience with the inability of companies to fulfill pension obliga111.
112.
113.
114.
1960).
115.

P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING REP.
Id.

15,075.

CABINEI COMMrrrEE REPORT 50.
TAXATION OF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

258

(Sellin ed.

Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 94, 98.
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tions, and the development of large insurance and trust company expertise
in devising and managing pension plans.11 6
Although not uniformly adopted, the term "funding" is often used to
indicate the manner in which contribution rates are calculated and funds
accumulated, and the term "financing" is used to denote the manner in which
the funds are administered and benefits provided.117
Funding Methods
Funding of pension plans is the process of accumulating, generally over
a period of many years, assets in a pension fund that are irrevocably designated to pay benefits to plan participants in the future. In an unfunded
pension plan, the employer does not segregate assets for the payment of
pension benefits as they fall due, but he normally adopts a bookkeeping
practice to indicate the accumulation of surplus for that purpose. In contrast, a plan is fully funded when the accumulated assets are at all times at
least equal to accrued liabilities. Intermediately, and in almost universal
use, is the practice of partially funding accrued liabilities. This is the area
of controversy at present. Disagreement over the degree of partial funding
sufficient to insure adequate security of anticipated benefits has generated
8
the minimum funding issue.."
Accrued liabilities represent the present value of future benefits owed to
participants. Definitionally, accrued liabilities are composed of three components: current service liabilities, past service liabilities, and liabilities from
retroactive increases in the benefit levels, if any. Current service liabilities
represent the present value of future benfits that are based upon employee
service performed during a particular year, usually the current one. Past
service liabilities represent the present value of future benefits that are based
on employee service performed prior to the inception of the plan. Upon
establishment of a plan, there are usually a number of older employees with
many years of service. If this older group has only a few years before retirement, contributions based on future service will be inadequate to provide a
reasonable pension. Past service credits rectify this situation. Lastly, liabilities from retroactive increases in benefit levels represent the present value of
future benefit increases that are based on employee service performed prior
to the inception of the increase." 9
Accrued liabilities may be funded, partially funded, or unfunded. Unfunded accrued liabilities are often the result of so-called past service credits,
as well as retroactive benefit increases. In addition, accrued liabilities may
also reflect any deficits or surpluses arising from inadequate or excessive past
contributions.
The organization and administration of a pension plan is termed its
"financing," and the choice of a financing method determines to a great
116.

TAXATION

OF DE1ER'tED EMPLOYEE AND ExEcuTIVE COMPENSATION 258-59

(SeUin

ed. 1960).
117. Id. at 260.

118.

CABINET CoMmrrEE REPORT 48;

119.

Comment, supra note 32, at 1266.

Comment, supranote 32, at 1265.
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extent who, between employer and the holder of the funds, will bear the
risks of investment yield and mortality after retirement and will have a
bearing on the method of funding.
The trust fund is probably the oldest form of the funded plan and the
one in most frequent use today. Contributions of cash or securities are made
systematically to the trustee who invests them. Actuarial evaluation is required periodically to avoid over or under funding. When an employee
becomes entitled to a pension, the trustee pays it directly from the funds in
its possession.120 Investments may be made in stocks, bonds, or insurance
contracts. If insurance is involved, the trustee usually buys individual annuity
contracts, which may or may not contain life insurance. These insurance
contracts are then held by the trustee until the employee retires. The plan
may be self-administered or run by an administrative committee appointed
by the employer with a bank, trust company, or individuals as a trustee, or
it may be jointly administered by company and union representatives, or be
union administered with the same choices as to a bank, trust company, or
individuals as trustee. The plan with trustee usually offers more flexibility
than an insured plan. For a small employer the plan with a trustee is uneconomical to administer and too limited to provide diversification of investments. Pooled pension trust funds are provided by some banks to overcome
this limitation.121
Group annuity contracts sold by insurance companies provide single
premium deferred annuities if and when the employee becomes eligible for
benefits under the plan. Premium rates are guaranteed for a fixed period,
usually 5 years, subject to adjustment at the end of each period with respect
to future premiums. The insurer assumes risk of mortality and investment
yield. Premiums are calculated to provide for administration costs and a
profit.
The deposit administration method of financing is a hybrid of the trust
fund and the group annuity forms. Contributions are made to an insurance
company, which acts as a trustee accumulating funds for the ultimate purchase of annuities. As with group annuities, the insurer guarantees the
investment yield and annuity premium for a fixed period, subject to periodic
adjustment. Upon retirement, the insurance company charges the fund with
the cost of a single premium immediate annuity, which is thereafter paid to
the participant. Deferred annuities may be provided in the plan to be
purchased prior to retirement and charged against the fund. A trustee can
be used in connection with a deposit administration plan, paying for insur2
ance policies from a trust fund.1 2

A split-funded plan is designed to obtain some of the advantages of both
the insured plan and the trusteed plan. A portion of the funds is invested
in annuity contracts and the remainder is placed in a trust and invested in
common stocks or other assets.
120. TAXATION OF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 268 (Sellin ed.
1960).
121. E. WOOD, J. CERNY S H. RAFUSE, supra note 42, at 186.
122. TAXATION OF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 268-69 (Sellin
ed. 1960).
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Special financing methods, usable primarily for self-employed retirement,
include investment in "open-end" regulated investment companies through
a custodial account in a bank; annuity, endowment, or life insurance contracts through a custodial account in a bank; face-amount certificates, with
23
or without a trust; and special United States retirement bonds.
Various cost methods are available to fund retirement benefits provided
by pension plans. The unfunded, or pay-as-you-go plan is the simplest
treatment, paying retirement benefits directly out of employer funds. Not
tax qualified, the unfunded plan provides deductions only in the years in
24
which pensions are paid and to the extent reasonable.1
The funded plan most similar to the pay-as-you-go type is the terminally
funded plan. Under this arrangement, no funding takes place until employees
retire. Annuities are then purchased, or funds set aside to provide benefits.
Modifications can be made, such as a 5-year terminal funded plan in which
funding commences when an employee reaches an age 5 years prior to
retirement. Funding is then divided on a level basis over the remaining
25
years of employment.
Another cost method is the entry-age-normal-cost method. The cost of
benefiits anticipated to be paid at normal retirement is determined for each
employee. Total costs are averaged out from the age at which the employee
would have been eligible for participation to normal retirement. Designed
to spread the total cost on a level basis to retirement, it is used in a selfadministered plan and can be compared with the level premium method of
12
determining insurance premiums. 6
Under the unit-credit-cost method, estimated costs are determined for
each unit of benefit accruing to the credit of a participant. The past service
liability is amortized in future years and contributed annually in addition to
normal cost. This amortization may be fixed by a collective bargaining
agreement, or contributions for past service credits may be made to coincide
with the deduction limitation of 10 per cent per year. 27 The unit-credit-cost
method is used in some self-administered plans and generally in group
annuity plans. The average cost of benefits tends to increase as the covered
28
employees mature.
The frozen-initial-liability method is intended to keep the past service
costs and funds unaffected by any difference between experience and the
assumptions in the initial estimate. Effects of differences are carried into the
subsequent normal costs. Normal cost for the first year of the plan, and past
service cost at the beginning of the year, may be determined in the same
manner as the entry-age-normal-cost method. Unfunded past service cost at
the beginning of the second year is computed by adding to the previous past
service cost interest for one year and subtracting from the total the sum of
123. E. WooD, J. CaNY & H. RArUSE, supra note 42, at 187-88.
124. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §404 (a) (5).
125. Goodman, Funding Benefits Under Tax Qualified Pension and Annuity Plans,
45 TAxrs 25, 34 (1967).
126. Id. at 34-35.
127. lIT. R v. CODE of 1954, §404 (a) (1) (C).
128. Goodman, supranote 125, at 35.
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the past service contribution for the first year and interest at the same rate
to the end of the year. Normal cost for the second year is determined by
subtracting the sum of assets and unfunded past service cost at the beginning
of the year from the estimated present value at such time of the total benefits
expected to be paid. The remainder is spread over the expected future
service of participants as a level percentage of expected future compensation,
and this procedure is continued in determining costs in future years. 1 9
A similar procedure is used in the attained-age-normal method. At the
beginning of the plan, the initial past service cost is determined in the same
manner as under the unit-credit-cost approach, and the current cost for the
first year is calculated by spreading the estimated present value at the beginning of all benefits anticipated for future service of the original participants
over their expected future service as a level percentage of expected future
compensation. The cost in future years may be then determined as under
the frozen-initial-liability method. 130
The individual-level-annual-cost method is used to determine the cost
of benefits on a level annual basis from the time each employee enters the
plan to retirement. Contributions in equal annual amounts and increments
thereon accumulate to the amount required to provide the anticipated retirement benefits. The aggregate-cost method is similar, except that an
average rate is used for all employees. A contribution rate is determined
each year by first subtracting from the present value of all benefits to be paid
in the future the balance in the fund and then dividing the remainder by
the present value of future covered compensation of current active participants. This rate is applied to covered payroll and determines the amount
of the contribution.'-'
The choice of a funding method will depend upon the type of financing
called for by the plan, whether past or future service benefits are to be
funded, the employer's cash position, and tax considerations., 32 Three methods of determining the deduction limitation are available. Either 5 per cent
of covered compensation,13 3 a level distribution,13 or normal cost plus 10
per cent of past service liability135 may be selected. No one method will produce the largest deduction in every instance. In a plan with many employees
and a large covered payroll, the first method may produce the largest deduction. Where a number of participants are within a few years of retirement,
the second method may produce this result. Generally, however, the third
method is most frequently used.' 36
The only existing minimum funding required by present tax law calls for
contributions sufficient to cover current service liabilities and the interest
129. Id.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id.
132. TAXATION OF

DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND ExEcuTivE

COMPENSATION

272

(Sellin ed.

1960).
1954, §404 (a) (1) (A).

133.

INT. REV. CODE Of

134.

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §404 (a) (1) (B).

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §404 (a) (1) (C).
136. Goodman, supra note 125, at 37.

135.
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charges on other unfunded components of accrued liabilities.". 7 This minimum standard for qualification applies only to plans in which one or more
of the employer's 25 highest paid employees is a participant. Present tax law
is not designed to assure adequate funding but is intended to prevent discrimination in favor of near-retirement-age, high-salaried employees by a
termination of the plan after this group have received full pensions, leaving
insufficient funds to pay the other employees. 138 This result is probably all
that tax law should be concerned with accomplishing.
Adequacy of Funding
The Cabinet Committee found that present standards of funding require
strengthening to provide more adequate funding as well as enforcement of
minimum requirements at qualification of a plan as well as during its
existence. Acknowledging that only about 700 basic retirement plans covering fewer than one-half million workers are completely unfunded and that
the great majority of pension plans are already operating with funding procedures meeting the committee's requirements, recommendations for minimum funding standards have been made. 189 The committee found that
inadequate funding places unwarranted financial risk upon employees during
retirement. If funds are not available to meet promised pensions, hardships
and ill feeling will be generated. The committee asserted that present tax
law allows the employer too much discretion in selecting a method of funding
accrued liabilities and that this flexibility may lead to failure to pay promised
benefits. The committee did not recognize that many pensions are bargained
for by unions -and if funding is inadequate, it is often not the fault of the
employer. However, the committee's recommendations have raised an inquiry
into the adequacy of present funding requirements and practices in private
pensions. An examination of the functioning of present funding is necessary
to evaluate these findings.
A recent study of pension funding concludes that most of the large private
pension plans are well funded and use both conventional funding methods
and realistic actuarial assumptions. Of 93 plans examined, only 8 were not
funded. The remaining plans reported using all of the conventional funding
methods, with the entry-age-normal-cost method used most frequently. Minor
change was reported in retirement age assumptions between 1939 and 1964,
although changes in mortality and interest rate assumptions gave more
40
realistic, thorough conservative, estimates of plan costs.
Source materials for these studies came from reports of a selected number
of larger pension funds under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
of 1958. Of the 93 plans used in the study, nonretired membership in 1959
was 5.3 million and nonretired membership in 1964 was 5A million. All plans
reporting nonretired membership in excess of 25,000 were included.
187. Treas. Reg. §1.4014(c) (1963).
138. Comment, supra note 32, at 1267.

139.

Cmuxr CoMMrrEE RPoRT 47-54.

140. Krislov, A Study of Pension Funding, 89 MoNTHLy
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Of the 85 plans that were funded, 10 with a combined membership of
700,000 did not report liabilities in sufficient detail to calculate funded
ratios. The remaining 75 plans, covering 4.2 million workers, reported liabilities of $24.1 billion and assets of $16.7 billion in 1964, or an average funded
ratio of 69 per cent. Distribution of these plans as to individual plans and
nonretired membership is shown in Table 10.
TABLE 10
Funded Ratios, 1964141

Funded Ratio

Number of
Plans

Nonretired Members
(thousands)

75
4
14
10
15
32

4,240
111
842
808
807
1,672

Total
Less than 20 per cent
20-39 per cent
40-59 per cent
60-79 per cent
80 per cent

Older plans studied were more adequately funded than younger ones, as
might be expected. Of the plans reporting funding ratios of 80 per cent or
more, 19 had been in existence for at least 25 years. Three of the 4 plans
1 42
reporting funding below 20 per cent were organized in the 1950's.
In contrast, 1959 found the 75 plans reporting liabilities of $14.8 billion
and assets of $9.9 billion, or an average funded ratio of 67 per cent. Table
11 illustrates this distribution as to individual plans and nonretired members.
TABLE 11
Funded Ratios, 1959143

Funded Ratio
Total
Less than 20 per cent
20-39 per cent
40-59 per cent
60-79 per cent
80 per cent

Number of
Plans

Nonretired Members
(thousands)

75
10
13
12
13
27

4,264
464
712
967
662
1,447

In the 1959 study, as in the 1964 reports, the older plans tended to be
more adequately funded. A movement toward more adequate funding for all
plans is observed, coming with plan maturity. The average funded rates
increased from 67 to 69 per cent. This increase is significant because of
plan improvements and benefit increases during this 5-year period. Of the
27 plans with funding of 80 per cent or more, 17 had been in existence for
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 639.
Id. at 639.
Id.
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at least 25 years, and of the 10 plans with funded ratios below 20 per cent,
44
7 were established in the 195 0's..
Multiemployer union negotiated plans were not as well funded as single
employer plans. None of the 16 multiemployer plans had a funded ratio
as high as the average ratio for all plans in either 1959 or 1964. Multiemployer plans were typically started in the 1950's and considerably later than
most single employer plans. In both years studied, many of the larger plans
were quite well funded. The number and coverage of plans reporting a
funded ratio of less than 40 per cent decreased from 23 plans covering 1.2
million workers in 1959 to 18 plans with one million participants in 1964.15
Unions are generally more concerned with higher benefits than with rapid
funding.
Different types of cost methods were employed in funding the 98 plans
studied. Distribution of cost methods among numbers of individual plans
and their membership is illustrated in the following table for 1964:
TABLE 12
Distribution of Cost Methods, 1964146
Number of

Nonretired Members

Plans

(thousands)

Total

93

5,384

Aggregate cost
Entry age normal cost
Unit credit
Individual level annual premium
Attained age normal
Liability funded for retired members only
Not stated
Unfunded

14
31
15
12
5
1
7
8

641
2,141
897
489
366
22
403
425

The aggregate cost and individual level annual premium methods accumulate assets generally faster than other methods. Of 12 plans using the
individual level annual premium method, 10 reported assets and liabilities
in enough detail to calculate a funded ratio. Five of the 10 reported funded
ratios of nearly 90 per cent in 1964, and all had improved since 1959. Aggregate cost funding was confined to plans in the telephone industry, where
all plans were almost fully funded in 1964, and all reported a higher ratio
than in 1959. Significantly, many of these plans anticipated full funding by
1968.147
Other funding methods accumulate a'sets less rapidly - such as entry age
normal cost, unit credit, and attained age normal. These are the major
funding methods. About one-third of the plans covering approximately 40
per cent of the workers used the entry age normal cost method. Fifteen plans
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id.
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covering almost one-sixth of the workers used the unit credit cost method.
The funding pattern for this number of plans was similar to the entry age
normal cost group. Funded ratios varied in 1964 from a low of 15 per cent
to a high of 89 per cent. Nearly all plans increased their funding ratios between 1959 and 1964. New plans and multiemployer plans appeared to have
148
the weakest funding of the group.
The picture given by the foregoing study is at variance with the committee's grave concern over inadequate funding. In fact, it would appear
that much of the committee's concern is groundless. An examination of
specific instances where inadequate funding has resulted in a loss of benefits
to covered employees is required to evaluate fully the minimum funding
dispute in the light of these findings.
The failure of the Studebaker pension plan to pay the valid claims of
several thousand former workers with "vested" rights to pension benefits,
coming with the shutdown of the company's plant in South Bend, Indiana, in
1963, focused attention upon the unfortunate results occurring when a plan
terminates without completely funding benefits. 149

Not only were all em-

ployees discharged, but almost all employes between the ages of 40 and 60
with 10 or more years of service, who thereby were entitled to vested benefits,
had little, if anything, to show for such services. The employees without
vested rights received nothing.
Studebaker Corporation has pointed out that until the pension plan
came into existence, hourly employees were not covered by any retirement
arrangements. The plan provided that years of service with the company to
be counted included past service. Older employees thereby suddenly acquired
rights of considerable value, which they did not previously possess. The
company had to provide for these past service credits for a large number of
long-service employees and chose funding over a 30-year period. The problem
arose because the life of the plan was insufficient to fund these liabilities
entirely.
During the 14 years of its existence, the Studebaker plan accumulated
assets of $37.9 million. It provided pensions for 4,626 individuals, 3,401 of
whom were receiving pensions after the plan's termination. From 1950 until
1964, $13.9 million in pensions were paid out. Upon termination in November 1964, the plan paid out $21.5 million to purchase annuities for retired
employees. After termination, it paid out $2.4 million in lump-sum distributions to 4,080 employees with vested rights but not eligible for retirement. Under the terms of the termination agreement eligible employees
attaining age 60 by November 1, 1964, could apply for pensions; former
employees with vested rights, if terminated prior to November 1, 1961, could
apply for pensions if they became 65 by November 1, 1964; disability pensions were provided for those disabled prior to November 1, 1964; and
annuities were purchased guaranteeing full lifetime pensions for those re-

148.

Id.

149. Bernstein, Shortcomings of Private Pension Plans: Problems When an Employer
Departs, Decays or Disappears, 18 N.Y.U. ANN. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 437, 443 (1966).
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tired. Assets remaining after the purchase of annuities were distributed to
those with vested rights. 50
Of the lump-sum distribution of $2.4 million, individual payments ranged
from 250 dollars to 1,200 dollars, and averaged 600 dollars. The average age
of the employees in this group with vested rights was between 51 and 52
years, and the average service with the company was almost 23 years. More
than 20 of this group were dose to minimum retirement age and had service
credits of more than 40 years.' 5'
The Studebaker plan represents a case where an orderly funding schedule was insufficient to safeguard vested benefits, even though it met the
minimum standard suggested by the Cabinet Committee for stated benefit
plans of funding past service credits over 30 years.
The less publicized but equally painful 1955 Packard shutdown in Detroit had the same result as Studebaker, but was even more severe. Not-only
were there no funds to pay vested credits, but funds were inadequate to pay
full benefits of retirees. Packard also established its plan in 1950, and
1 52
adopted a 30-year schedule of funding past service credits.
It is readily apparent that plan terminations during early years may have
similar results for pension benefits, unless arrangements are made to assume
these obligations. However, aside from well publicized cases such as Studebaker and Packard, incomplete data is available to measure the extent of
benefit loss upon plan termination.
A recent study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of pension plan terminations was made by examining reports filed under the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act for a group of 99 terminated plans, each with 100
participants or more. Of this number, sufficient data was available to measure
participant benefit loss in only 26 cases.
In 10 of the 26 terminations, including Studebaker, some participant
benefit loss occurred. Covering over 10,000 workers, including 8,500 Studebaker employees, the assets of these plans averaged about one-half of their
reported liabilities, but benefit loss was probably less than this fraction. Six
other plans had insufficient assets to fund accrued liabilities, but no immediate losses occurred since participants were transferred to other plans. The
remaining 10 plans with 2,300 workers appeared to be almost fully funded.
This group of plans was generally older than the typical terminating plan,
and consequently had a longer period to fund their obligations. 15
It is obviously important to a measurement of benefit loss upon plan
termination to ascertain when such terminations are most likely to occur.
Of 8,100 qualified retirement plans terminated during the years 1955-1965,
over half were pension plans. Data from the termination records of the
Internal Revenue Service show that terminating plans tended to be young
and small in size. More than half were no more than 6 years old, and two150. 21 P-H PENSION & PRoFrr-SHARING REP. No. 54, at 7-8 (1966).
151. 21 P-H PENSION & PRoFIT-SHARING REP. No. 35, at 3 (1966).
152. Bernstein, supra note 99, at 81.
153. Beier, Terminations of Pension Plans: 11 Years' Experience, 90 MoNTmHy LABOR
REv. No. 6, at 26, 29-30 (1967).
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thirds covered fewer than 25 employees. The most frequently stated reasons
for termination were company and plan mergers, financial difficulties, and
business dissolution. The 4,300 terminated pension plans covered approximately 225,000 employees affecting, on the average, about 20,000 workers a
year -about one-tenth of one per cent of total pension coverage.
A marked upward trend in frequency of terminations was evident. The
rise in number did not follow an even path, fluctuating in a manner that in
part reflected changing business conditions. The greatest number of terminations occurred in 1961, a year of relatively low economic activity. On
the other hand, during 1963, a relatively good business year, not only did
terminations increase but many were attributed to financial difficulty.
The median age of terminated plans was 6 years. Three out of 10 terminations involved plans no more than 3 years old. Approximately one-fourth
of the plans were of more than 10 years duration. The older plans were
substantially larger than newer terminating plans. Half of the participants
were in plans in existence for 9 years or more.1 5 4 Some terminated plans
were large, but most covered relatively few employees. Ninety per cent had
fewer than 100 workers, and 45 per cent had fewer than 10. The median
plan had 13 members, and coverage of the median plan had dropped from
more than 15 participants in the late 1950's to about 10 employees during
the mid-1960's.
Mortality among younger plans was attributed to both a tendency for
plans to be less stable in early years and other differences not directly related
to age. The high proportion of small plans among all pension plans largely
accounts for their high proportion among terminations. The decline in the
median size may reflect a reduction in average size of new plans, but since
a higher incidence of financial difficulty or organizational change occurs in
smaller companies, a higher rate of termination is predictable. The spreading of pension plans into industries having higher mortality may have affected
among small
the termination rate. Multiemployer plans, or a pooling device
155
employers, would seem to offer greater stability to employees.
Although a lack of information prevented a determination of benefits
lost through plan terminations, some inferences could be drawn as to the
magnitude of loss in the typical case, using traditional funding patterns.
Employers were found to adopt one of several actuarial methods that eliminate abrupt fluctuations and sharp increases in the amount of yearly contributions. Even though the system selected would provide for substantially
lower contributions once the liabilities have been funded, such reductions
would seldom be realized because of periodic increases in plan benfits. The
more customary methods will, on the average, fund between 20 and 40 per
cent of accrued benefit obligations by the end of the 5th year of operation.
Between 45 and 65 per cent of accrued benefits will be funded by the end
of the 10th year if there have been no major plan amendments or asset
changes. Increased benefits have been found to be offset by increases in
asset values.
154. Id. at 26-27.
155.

Id.
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These funding patterns suggested that, unless coverage was continued
through the transfer of credits to other plans, members would stand to lose
between 60 and 80 per cent of their total accrued benefits if their plan
terminated in its 5th year. Most of this loss would be attributable to past
service credits. At 10 years, the total loss would range between 35 and 55
per cent, assuming only modest changes in plan amendments and assets. In
all cases, a system of priority may allocate the loss among participants from
none to 100 per cent. 156
Although lack of detailed information prevented a more accurate appraisal of the magnitude of benefit losses, it is apparent that the largest risk
area occurs during the first 10 years of life for a pension plan, both from the
standpoint of a high incidence of terminations as well as the lowest level of
funding benefits for past service credits. This condition will probably always
exist, at least to some degree, due to economic fluctuations that inevitably
occur.
Financial Solvency
The committee found that actuarial standards for tax qualification were
insufficient to guarantee that promised benefits will in fact be paid and
recommended minimum standards with frequent periodic review of assumptions. Adequate funding may require a system of insurance to protect
members in event of premature terminations. The committee also felt that
fiduciary responsibility should be strengthened through appropriate regulation. These proposals affect the ability of a pension plan to meet its obligations as stated and are considered together for this reason.
Actuarial soundness has been defined as existing where the level of current
and expected future contributions are adequate to meet all future benefits
to be paid. This definition would not require adequacy upon a chance
termination. From a practical viewpoint, soundness would seem to require
157
the ability to meet all valid claims arising on termination.
The committee found it advisable to recommend acturial certification of
the funding process at the beginning of every plan and periodically thereafter.
Basic guidelines, or ranges of standards for actuarial assumptions were also
recommended. 58 No specific standards were offered, however.
In creating a pension plan, an actuarial estimate of factors influencing
its cost must be made, including the expected interest rate, rates of mortality,
termination of employment, disability, retirement, salary progression, age of
spouses, rates of remarriage of widows, and probability of parenthood, in
addition to expenses of administration. 59
These assumptions are of considerable importance in determining
whether the calculated assets and liabilities are a reasonable estimate of the
eventual assets and liabilities. If the actuary assumes an interest rate in
156. Id. at go.
157.
158.
159.

M. BERNst=, supra note 81, at 201.
CABiNEt CoMMrrrEE REPORT 53-54.
TAXAnON
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EMPLOYEE AND

ExEcuTr
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281 (Sellin ed.

1960).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. Xxi

excess of the actual earned rate, then the fund is being over-credited with
assets that it will not have. Conversely, if an interest rate is assumed that
falls below the actual earned rate, then the fund will accumulate more
assets than required to fund the benefits.
Each assumption must be based upon accumulated information and the
actuary's judgment in applying the data to the group participating in the
plan. For example, the use of a general mortality table is likely to understate the number of deaths and overstate the cost of a plan covering a group
in a hazardous occupation. Similarly, the same table is likely to overstate
the number of deaths and understate the cost of a plan in an occupation
noted for longevity. The selection of an interest rate will depend upon
prevailing economic conditions and the plan's investment policy. Plans investing heavily in common stock are likely to assume higher interest rates
than plans that do not. 60
A recent survey, based upon information furnished under the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, indicates that in 1964, 71 out of 77 plans
examined reported interest rate assumptions of at least 3.25 per cent, with
12 plans reporting a rate of 4 per cent. Interest rates have been on an
upward trend during the period from 1959 to 1964. Insured pension plans
reported increases for this interval from 3.96 per cent to 4.53 per cent in
1964, while corporate pension plans during the same period have averaged
over 4 per cent. The interest rate assumption is of particular importance in
evaluating a plan's liabilities since, in a typical plan, a variation of one-fourth
of one per cent in the interest rate assumption can be expected to produce a
difference of 6 to 7 per cent in the over-all valuation of liabilities. 161
Mortality rate assumptions are based largely upon annuity tables developed by life insurance companies. Based upon observed mortality rates,
these tables do not reflect possible changes, and the actuary must make
adjustments in the use of the older tables. Use of more recent tables, with
adjustments for improvements in mortality rates, will result in a more
realistic estimate of cost. More than half of the 77 plans studied were
using 1951 annuity tables, and most of this group had made adjustments for
expected improvement in mortality rates.
Unlike the trends in interest rates and mortality tables, retirement age
assumptions have not changed significantly between 1959 and 1964. Eighteen plans, mostly in the telephone industry, reported using retirement age
assumptions based upon their own experience. Of the remaining 42 plans,
60 per cent in both 1959 and 1964 used retirement ages of from 65 to 67
years. The proportion of workers retiring before 65 has increased. In 1964,
about two-thirds of the women and one-half of the men receiving Social
Security benefits were under 65 years of age.
It would appear that some plans should reduce their retirement age
assumptions. However, since many plans reduce benefits for early retirement,
there may be no impact upon plan cost as the number of early retirements
160.
161.

Krislov, supra note 140, at 640.
Id. at 641.
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increases. Further, the increase in total number of early retirements under

Social Security may not typify the situation with each pension plan.162
Significant variations are observed in the foregoing study of interest
mortality and retirement rate assumptions. Only if the assumptions made
can be reasonably expected to reflect the plan's experience can the assets and
liabilities be adequately projected to achieve a funded ratio that is a reasonable estimate of benefit security.
The choice of a method of funding determines the level of contributions
and their timing. This, in turn, determines the ability of the plan to meet
valid claims in the event of termination. For example, one plan might
employ a funding method calling for high initial contributions decreasing
during the life of the plan, and another might use a method requiring low
initial contributions. Both methods may employ assumptions that are
actuarially sound. However, in the case of an early termination, the former
will be in a much better position to pay vested benefits than the latter.
Clearly, actuarial soundness does not imply an ability to meet benefits upon
premature termination. In this respect, some "sound" plans are more sound
than others.163
The Cabinet Committee recommended serious study of the matter of
reinsuring pension benefits from loss upon termination. Rejecting any thought
of employer guarantees of benefits, the committee suggested study along the
lines of a government agency, akin to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to strengthen pension assets, although this is hardly a good analogy.
Doubt concerning questions of insurable risk, administration, and experience
upon which to base premiums prevented the committee from making any
specific judgment on this issue.164 The cost of such a program would be
very high and perhaps not worth the effort. Nevertheless, from surveys of
benefit losses, it is readily apparent that the greatest risk of pension plan
mortality and the lowest funded ratio occurs in the first 10 years of pension
plan life. Vesting and funding cannot, without prohibitive costs, solve the
problems of premature terminations and resulting benefit loss. However,
improving the pension system under current proposals will not be complete
without some examination of the resinsurance issue.
One form of insurance, the idea of imposing the burden of a guarantee
of plan benefits upon the employer, has been proposd. Such a plan would
require the employer to guarantee vested credits and particularly those
earned since the inception of the plan. Most criticism of this proposal has
come in the area of past service credits. A compulsory employer guarantee
of past service credits might curtail their establishment entirely because the
liability imposed would be prodigious. The cost, if calculable, would be
prohibitive. A California statute, which originally required such full funding
of past service credits, effectively discouraged including these benefits in
pension plans subject to this act.1 65 Past service credits benefit older employ162. Id. at 642.
163. M. BmaNsrErN, supra note 81, at 201.
164. CABInT COMMiTtEE REPORT 58.
165. CAL. CoRP. CODE §28403 (Deering 1962), as amended;
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ees, and it would be poor policy indeed to discourage provisions for their
retirement. More realistic would be guarantees of future service credits or
more stringent funding requirements. Other private financing proponents
favor a special loan pool to enable employers encountering difficulty to
borrow in order to meet benefit drains. However, employers in such straits
and under no obligation to provide benefits would be the least inclined
to do so.'

66

Although serious questions exist as to the validity or desirability, most
active interest centers around a public guarantee system or reinsurance
program under which valid benefit claims would be guaranteed. Funded
through a "pool" of premiums and earnings from a large number of plans,
such a fund could make payments for individual plans when they were
unable to do so. With reinsurance, proponents maintain, saving could be
reduced substantially. Premiums based upon the life expectancy of the plan
would be small since many large single and multiemployer plans have long
life expectancies. However, premiums for some high risk plans could equal
the contributions needed to fund the plan. Limiting reinsurance to only
low risk plans and encouraging high risk plans to enter a supplementary
OASI plan arrangement would be one solution, but this would defeat the
policy of encouraging private retirement. Although public or private agencies
could be the reinsurer, an inappropriate analogy has been attempted with
FDIC. The low risks involved in insuring bank deposits and risks involved
in insuring pension promises can hardly be compared. Problems of the
runaway plant, disappearance of plans through merger, and the moribund
company increasing plan benefits in a fraudulent attempt to cash in on
insurance benefits are only a few of the problems facing reinsurance. 16' The
most difficult problems would be ascertaining premium costs and then deciding whether the risks are worth it. It seems unfair to subject well financed
plans in stable industries to the cost of premiums to support poorly financed
plans in short-lived enterprises. The list of problems seems endless. Nevertheless, a worthwhile insurance system providing minimum protection for
plans conforming to minimum standards may be a desirable social objective. 168
It should not be at public expense, however, if private retirement is to
remain "private." Any initial program will be an experiment.
More complete fiduciary responsibility in the form of disclosure and
supervision of plan administration and investment policy has been proposed.
In a message to Congress on February 16, 1967, asking for legislation to
protect the American consumer, President Johnson urged enactment of a
"Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act of 1967." This proposal envisioned
standards of fiduciary responsibility for plan administrators, yearly audits
of plan books, more complete disclosure of financial activities, maximum
limits on investments in stock of the employer company, an extension of
254.
166. M.
167.

BERNSTEIN,

supra note 81, at 254.

U.S.

MATERIALS,

CONGRESS JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY, STAFF
OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE: AN OUTLINE OF ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 29-30

(1966).
168. M.

BERNSTEIN,

supra note 81, at 255.
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enforcement and investigative powers, and legal remedies for losses incurred
by beneficiaries caused by breaches of faith by plan administrators. 169
The Cabinet Committee made relatively minor recommendations in this
area. Proposing a strengthening of statutory provisions to insure compliance
with existing fiduciary standards, and greater disclosure of relevant information concerning plan administration, the committee felt that it was premature
to recommend a regulatory agency to act as guardian for the collective
interests of plan participants. It suggested limiting investments in employer
stock to 10 per cent and distributing greater information under the Welfare
Plan Disclosure Act concerning investment holdings and
and Pensions
0
activitiesY1
Within the framework of existing law, pension trustees have considerable
latitude in investing pension funds and in practice, most plans receive and
follow excellent investment advice. The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act avoids regulation of investments, 17 1 and applicable tax law makes no
effort to do so.' 72 Although the restrictions against self-dealing investments
beneficial to the employer serve as a limitationy13 and disclosure must be
made of reasons for investment in securities of the employer,, 4 there is no
present prohibition against self-dealing investment practices. 7 5 Some restrictions may well prove beneficial. A qualified pension plan will not lose
its status if the Internal Revenue Service is satisfied that the plan is operated
for the benefit of the participants76 and does not disregard the most
elementary investment practices. 77 The cost of an investment must not
exceed fair market value at time of purchase, there must be a "fair return,"
sufficient liquidity must be maintained, and safeguards that a prudent
investor would observe must exist. 78 No close supervision is exercise as a
practical matter, however. There is little uniformity of judgment in the
field of investments, in any event. Supervision would be difficult, indeed.
Nevertheless, some restriction of investment discretion may be anticipated.
Common stock investments have increased considerably in recent years. A
recent analysis by the Securities and Exchange Commission indicates that
the common stock holdings of noninsured private pension funds, the second
largest institutional holder of stock, increased from $1.1 billion at the end
of 1950 to $39.7 billion at the end of 1965.Y-9 Larger percentages of private
pension assets are invested in common stocks. Aside from mortgages and
other investments of the Teamsters Union in Las Vegas gambling hotels, golf
courses, a department store, a Detroit hotel, and a subdivision near Tampa,
169. 113 CONG. Ric. H. 1407 (Feb. 16, 1967).
170. CAmNmr COMMmrEE REPORT 73-79.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

171. 29 US.C. §308 (h) (1964).

Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (5) (i) (1964); INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §401 (a).
INT. R v. CODE of 1954, §503 (c).
Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (5) (i) (1964).
Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (5) (i) (1964); Comment, supra note 32, at 1269.
Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (5) (i) (1964); Comment, supra note 32, at 1269.
Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 Cum. BuuL. 128, 135.
Goodman, Strict Rules Limit Investment of Qualified Pension and Profit Plans,

14 J. TAXATION 153 (1961).
179. SEcumEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PUBLIC
COMPANY GRowTH, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 276-278 (1966).
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which have attracted considerable notoriety,8 0 but which have not proved
to be unsound, there is little evidence that all pension plans, both union
and jointly managed, are not well counselled and invested soundly. The
large majority of common stock holdings are of the "blue-chip" variety.
However, the apparent lack of interest shown by members in the pension
plans in which they participate, especially union plans, creates a situation
in which those who manage the plans may lack effective supervision. The
highly contingent right each employee has in the plan increases this immunity. In order to enforce standards of fiduciary responsibility, a legally identifiable beneficiary with sufficient legal interest in the trust res is necessary.
The equity of many plan participants is so tenuous that they can seldom
complain. It has been observed that the limited right of workers to complain
reinforced by little inclination to do so assures plan trustees of a life of
tranquil humanitarianism, if they are so disposed - and if they are not, they
will still have the tranquility.181
Another facet of fiduciary responsibility exists in management of union
funds. Some jointly managed plans are effectively union managed. A potential conflict of interest occurs between the union as plan administrator and
as a representative of the workers. Although union administration of multiemployer plans may achieve lower costs through the use of union records,
the opportunity exists to charge union administrative costs against the pension plan. A union can use plan management to control its members. Indeed,
in the public interest, plan administration should not be identified with
either unions or management. If funds were managed apart from either
union or employer control, less supervision and concern over unethical
fiduciary practices and investments would be required, and a more objective
watchdog in union supervision would be obtained. Recent proposals by
the President indicate that the trend is toward public regulation. Administrative decisions will still have to be made by plan officials for the foreseeable
future, but it would appear that government supervision of plan administration is approaching reality.182 If this supervision is not unduly restrictive,
an even better investment situation may be obtained.
Proposed Legislation
Several bills dealing with minimum funding requirements, reinsurance,
and standards of fiduciary responsibility have been introduced in the 90th
Congress. Some of these bills are receiving serious consideration, and one
or more may be enacted thereby changing existing law relative to some aspects
of private retirement. This is particularly so in the case of increased
standards of fiduciary responsibility.
The Cabinet Committee recommended that, with regard to stated benefit
plans, a minimum funding requirement of full funding of all current service
liabilities and full amortization of accrued liabilities. Past service credits
180. 108 CONG. REc. 20941 (1962).
181.

U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, supra note 167, at 45.

182.

Id. at 30.
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would have to be fully funded within 30 years from the inception of a new
plan or, in existing plans, within 30 years from the enactment of the proposed requirement. Retroactive increases in the level of benefits would have
to be fully funded on the same basis as past service credits, that is, within
30 years after the event giving rise to the liability. As a minimum standard
for funding fixed contribution plans, the committee recommended that
contribution commitments be realistically related to benefit promised and
83
actually paid.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley S. Surrey, reviewing recent
developments in May 1967, outlined several staff proposals for funding and
reinsurance. Pointing out the vital need for adequate funds to pay promised
benefits, Secretary Surrey noted that no amount of fine print in a pension
plan explaining that a vested benefit may be something different in the end
from an actual benefit will soothe the feeling of unfairness and deception
on the part of the employee, nor will it prevent the real hardship that the
deprivation of a vested and therefore expected benefit may mean. Although
without a valid basis, an aggrieved employee may indict the employer and
his government for any failure of funds. 8 4 Secretary Surrey further attempted
a comparison between pension participants, on one hand, and life insurance
beneficiaries and savings depositors on the other. These matters are not
analogous because both life insurance and savings accounts are created by
contributions of the owners, while most pensions are wholly noncontributory.
Staff proposals for strengthening funding requirements include measuring
its funding adequacy by comparing assets with liabilities for vested benefits
at least every 3 years. Discarding for the present any attempt to devise
standard actuarial assumptions for all factors, the staff found the most meaningful issue to be whether assets will equal vested liabilities and acceptance
of this as the ultimate goal for funding. Plans would be given 25 years to
reach this goal, and each plan would have a funding target each year-in
terms of a percentage of assets measured at market value to vested liabilities
-which it must meet, and this target would be increased at an annual rate
of 4 per cent of vested liabilities. A more liberal transitional schedule would
exist for the first few years after such legislation is enacted.
In order to solve the problem of termination prior to full funding, the
staff proposed reinsurance in the form of a common fund to which each plan
would make contributions. If a plan is terminated for business reasons,
amounts from the common fund would be available to make up the difference between its funding target and its vested liabilities not covered by
assets in the plan. This termination protection would not apply to the
extent an employer has not met his prescribed funding target, whether
because of a deficiency in contributions or an abnormal drop in the value of
the assets in the fund. Penalties would be-applied to a plan if it remained
below its funding target for more than 3 years. 85

183. CABINET CoMMniTEE REPORT 52.
184. Address by Stanley S. Surrey, supra note 100.
185. Id.
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The Javits bill, S. 1103,186 contains provisions for minimum funding
standards. Employer contributions must be sufficient to meet all current
costs and existing plans must fully fund all past service costs existing on
January 1, 1968, within 40 years from that date. New plans set up on or
after this date, or plans that are amended on or after that date to add
new past service costs, must fully fund the past service costs within 30 years
from the date of amendment or establishment. Experience dificiencies would
have to be made up within 5 years from the date the deficiency is determined.
This is the only proposed legislation now pending that attempts to establish
any minimum funding standards.187 This bill is probably intended for preliminary discussion rather than actual passage.
Several bills have been introduced dealing with reinsurance. The Hartke
bill, S. 1635,188 also introduced in the House by Representative Kupferman
as H.R. 9307,189 would establish a federal insurance program for private
pension plans, administered by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who has enough burdens under present law. Senator Hartke introduced
a similar bill in 1965, S. 1575,190 which would have insured beneficiaries
against loss of benefits arising from either insufficient funding due to a
cessation of operations by the employer or losses on the sale of investments
required to pay benefits. S. 1635 insures against the first of these contingencies.
Limits of protection remain the same-monthly retirement of disability
benefits would be insured up to 50 per cent of an employee's average monthly
wage in the 5-year period of his greatest earnings or 500 dollars per month,
whichever is less. A premium rate would be established by the Secretary,
with a maximum of one per cent for each dollar of unfunded obligations.
Insurance under this program would be required for tax qualification. Selfemployed plans would also be required to insure themselves under this
program with the only exception of one or more owner-employees who have
established a plan exclusively for his or their own benefit, or their survivors. 191
Without further study, this legislation could create an unwieldy situation.
The Javits bill also contains provisions for a federal reinsurance program
to insure against termination of the employer's business before the unfunded
liabilities are funded, at a premium not to exceed one per cent of the
1 2
unfunded liabilities. 9
H.R. 686,193 introduced by Representative Holland, also would establish
a federal reinsurance program in which all qualified pension plans would
have to participate, insuring against loss of benefits due to failure of the
employer to contribute because of closing his facilities or due to losses on
the sale of fund investments.?94 In the event of a number of plan failures,
186. S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
187. P-H PENSION & PROFrr-SHARING REP. 115,096.
188. S. 1635, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
189. H.R. 9307, 90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967).
190. S. 1575, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965).
191. 21 P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING REP. No. 4, at 5 (1966).
192. P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING REP. f15,096.
193. H.R. 689, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
194. P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING REP. 15,095.
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the taxpayers would have a moral obligation to guarantee the success of
reinsurance - hardly "private" retirement.
The Labor Department bill, S. 3421, and H.R. 17046, entitled the "Pension Benefit Security Act," in addition to mandatory vesting, also calls for
minimum funding and plan termination insurance, excluding plans that
provide for fixed contributions and that do not provide an amount expected
to be paid as a fixed benefit.
In addition to the present minimum requirement of funding current
service costs plus interest on past service liabilities, 100 per cent funding after
25 years is required. Newly created plans would have to reach 20 per cent
after 5 years of operation, with the ratio of assets to liabilities increasing by
4 per cent each year thereafter.
Existing plans would enter the funding schedule at current ratios, with
a 3 per cent increase in funding each year during the first 5 years operation.
Amendments adding vested liabilities can result in adjusting the funding
target. The funded ratio may be decreased in proportion to the ratio that
the increased liabilities bear to the plan's total liabilities after amendment.
If vested liabilities are increased more than 25 per cent, the added liabilities
may be treated as a new plan with separate funding targets.
Reports on funding would be required every three years, and plans
failing to meet the standard could be ordered to suspend accumulation of
vested liabilities. Enforcement is given to the Secretary of Labor, who can
order termination of a suspended plan.
The act proposes the creation of a pension benefit insurance corporation
to provide termination insurance to protect plan beneficiaries against loss of
benefits. A three-year basis would be used for insurance. Coverage would be
equal to the plan's vested liabilities, less 90 per cent of the plan's assets or
of the assets needed to meet the funding standard, whichever is greater. The
reduction from 100 per cent is designed to provide a uniform limited hedge
against loss due to a decline in the securities market.
Premiums would be based upon a uniform percentage of vested but
unfunded liabilities. Rates would be set by the corporation, and for the
initial three-year period would not exceed 0.6 per cent of the amount insured.
Failure to pay premiums would result in cancellation of insurance, and
operation of an uninsured plan would be unlawful. Wilful violation of the
act would be subject to stringent criminal penalties. A separate fund would
be created in the Treasury to hold premiums and other moneys received
by the corporation, from which all claims and expenses of operation would
be paid.
This legislation is unquestionably the most important pension development during the second session of the 90th Congress. The degree of regulation required is high and makes employers answerable to two federal agencies
for pension plans. This is a nontax bill covering areas traditionally handled
by tax legislation.
Several major bills have been introduced increasing the standards of
fiduciary responsibility. The Yarborough (administration) bill, S. 1024,195
195. S. 1024, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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the Javits bill, S. 1103, and the McClellan bill, S. 1255,196 and a companion
bill to S. 1024, H.R. 5741,197 introduced by Representative Perkins, have all
been introduced in the 90th Congress. In view of the President's Consumer
Protection Message delivered in February 1967, passage of one or more of
these bills is almost a certainty.
The administration bill, S. 1024, entitled "The Welfare and Pension Plan
Protection Act of 1967," in effect rewrites the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to require more detailed disclosure by qualified plans, to
provide for yearly audits, impose fiduciary responsibility on plan administrators and make them personally responsible for losses caused by their breach
of faith, limit investment in employer company stock by a pension plan, and
strengthen enforcement of the disclosure law. Senator McClellan's bill, S.
1255, would go even further in strengthening the Disclosure Act by prohibiting removal of funds beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts, limiting the
length of terms of trustees, prohibiting specific acts and increasing penalties
for violations. Senator Javits' bill, S. 1103, required an executed trust agreement for the benefit of employees, no deposits of investments outside the
United States, independent annual audits open to inspection, and that no
officer or employee of the employer or a labor organization can receive loans
or special benefits. These requirements would not apply to banks, trust
companies, or insurance companies.
Under the Yarborough bill, S. 1024, trust relationships may be created
by operation of law. The board of directors of every corporation adopting
a pension or profit-sharing plan and the officers of any union signing a contract in which such plans are agreed would become fiduciaries. Prohibited
transactions such as sales and purchases to and from an employer go beyond
the provisions of sections 503 (c) (4), (5) of the Internal Revenue Code 98
concerning transactions for less than an adequate consideration. In cases of
two or more corporate trustees, each trustee is required to use reasonable
care to prevent a cotrustee from committing a breach of trust. Exculpatory
clauses would be null and void.199 This legislation could go too far in
creating trust liabilities beyond those normally contemplated by a pension
trustee.
Representative Pucinski introduced H.R. 1119200 requiring more detailed
disclosure of investment transactions, and Representative Holland introduced
H.R. 692201 requiring disclosure of the turnover of participants in pension
plans. It required annual reports on the number of participants whose coverage was terminated during the year, the number who had vested rights,
and the number who had various amounts of service.202 These bills are harmless and would probably add some useful information. Representative Wydler
196. S. 1255, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
197. H.R. 5741, 90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967).
198. INT. Rlv. CODE Of 1954,

§§503

(c) (4)-(5).

199. Proposed Legislation Affecting Duties of Trustees Under Pension and Profit
Sharing Plans, 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusr J. 388 (1967).
200. H.R. 1119, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
201. H.R. 692, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
202.
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introduced H.R. 5906203 making it a crime to fail to make required contributions to pension plans, imposing a penalty of a 10,000 dollar fine or 6 months
imprisonment, or both for a willful violation.204 This proposal is, of course,
completely unrealistic.
Opposition to mandatory funding requirements comes equally from
management and labor. The basic reason is the cost to existing plans and
the retarding of creation of new plans. Union representatives, concerned
with multiemployer plans, point out that the likelihood of termination is
remote, and they are historically quite correct. A plan may not be fully
funded and yet be actuarially sound. Management opposes minimum funding
on grounds of loss of flexibility as well as increased cost, which are both valid
objections.
There can be little argument with the principle that employees should
have reasonable assurance that promised retirement income will be forthcoming. While minimum vesting would create rights for employees, which
had not been voluntarily given by employers, minimum funding merely
attempts to assure benefits already promised. And, as with minimum vesting,
the question is whether a minimum standard is appropriate and worth the
cost. It has been estimated that the Cabinet Committee's minimum funding
recommendations would increase costs at least as much as the vesting requirements. Although most plans studied appear to fall within the minimum
standards, the increased costs may force some employers to terminate present
plans or decrease benefits. 20 5 The larger hazard appears to be premature
termination, within the first 10 years of plan existence.
The most urgent problem in reinsurance is what risks are feasibly insured. To some degree, many terminations are within the employer's control,
such as sale or merger of the company. The fragmentation of the private
pension system makes it difficult to devise standards equally fair to all tax
qualified plans. Consolidation of plans would be one solution to this lack
of uniformity. Reinsurance appears to come the closest to this goal since it
extends to each plan the assurance of continuity enjoyed by all. 206 Yet, no one
can seriously suggest reinsurance as a substitute for adequate funding. Nor can
one accurately forecast the cost of reinsurance.
The present tax requirements for funding tend to discourage rather than
encourage rapid funding. In preventing the acceleration of tax deductions
for contributions, the practical effect is also to retard funding. A program
of reinsurance, unless carefully coordinated with minimum funding, would
give plans an incentive to fund as little as possible, with high benefits and
early vesting. The risks involved could be quite large, particularly in times
of recession when there would be a rapid increase in the number of business
failures. The proposal of contingent federal liabibity to underwrite emergency situations, such as a stock market debacle or a major recession, has been

203.
204.
205.
206.

H.RL 5906, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
22 P-H PENsION & PRoFrT-SHAiNG REP. No. 1, at 2 (1967).
Comment, supra note 32, at 1269.
US. CONGRESS JoINT EcoNoMIc CoMMrrrEE, supra note 167, at 18.
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made.2 0 7 But, as it has been observed, is it fair for consumers to finance the
cost of plans and then as taxpayers pay the pensions?208

Obviously, it is not.

It appears almost certain that standards of fiduciary responsibility will
be strengthened by enactment of some of the pending legislation. Funding
and reinsurance appear to be on their way, but not so quickly. Actuarial
standards have been shelved by the Treasury staff in their study proposals,
no pending legislation covers this aspect of pension planning. The only
question seems to be one of degree. The extent to which management and
labor will no longer have pension discretion in the interest of employee
benefit security is a matter of conjecture. Hopefully, careful study will precede the enactment of specific requirements in this regard.
INTEGRATION

WITH

SOCIAL SECURITY

Another important recommendation made by the Cabinet Committee
concerns integration of qualified plans with the basic OASI system. The
committee recommended that integration be continued, but that the employer be given credit for no more than one-half of the social security benefit,
on the theory that this would be consistent with the financing of OASI
20 9
benefits through equal tax contribution from employers and employees.
This suggestion, which appears destined for serious consideration and probable adoption, will have far-reaching effects upon the existing private pension
system.
The committee reasoned that under present tax law, in determining
whether the scale of benefits in a proposed plan discriminates in favor of
higher paid employees, the Internal Revenue Service includes the benefits
paid under OASI to the extent that these are financed by employer contributions. Presently, 78 per cent of maximum benefits are attributable to
the employer's contributions. This percentage represents that part of the
employee's benefits that cannot be attributed to employee contributions. A
plan that would be considered discriminatory in favor of higher compensated
employees standing alone may qualify if benefits under the plan together
with 78 per cent of the Social Security benefits considered jointly are not
discriminatory. The committee's objection to this approach is that it attributes more benefits to the employer than he has paid for with his own contributions and, in fact, credits the employer with everything not directly paid
for by the employees.2 10 The committee failed to point out why this is any
more incorrect than the arbitrary "fifty-fifty" approach they recommended.
The foregoing problem and its solution by the committee is simple to
state, but application of it to integrated plans will encounter problems of
comparing the total benefits under OASI with the benefits payable under
a specific type of pension plan. Benefits under Social Security include life
207.

Shield & Fefferman, The Challenge to the Private Pension System, 20 J. AMi.

SOC'Y CERTIFIED LIFE UNDRWRITRs 197, 212 (1966).
208. U. S. CONGRESS JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE, supra note 167 at 20.
209. CABINET CoMMrrrEE REPORT 62-63.
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annuities, benefits to widows, wives, children and parents, death benefits, and
disability benefits. Rarely will be benefits of any private pension plan completely parallel those available under OASI.211
President Johnson, in his Message on Older Americans to Congress, submitted on January 23, 1967, called for sweeping increases in Social Security
benefits to be financed by increases in the amount of earnings credited toward
benefits. Now at a level of 6,600 dollars per year, covered compensation is
proposed to increase to 7,800 dollars in 1968, to 9,000 dollars in 1971, and to
10,800 dollars in 1974. Corresponding increases in the rate of contribution
will be made to 4.5 per cent in 1969 and 5 per cent in 1973.212
On January 2, 1968, President Johnson signed into law H.R. 12080,213
entitled the "Social Security Amendments of 1967."214 No immediate increase
in the over-all tax rate of 4.4 per cent occurred, but benefit increases began
in February 1968, and will continue, increasing the taxable wage base to
7,800 dollars in 1968.215 Obviously, the extensive increases in benefits, wage
2
base, and tax rates will have a great effect upon private pension plans. 16
The combination of proposed changes in integration and increases in
Social Security benefits and taxes will have to be carefully coordinated with
existing pension plans. An examination of the current process of integration
and current proposals for its change is necessary to develop the depth of
this problem.
Mechanics of Integration
Integration is a means of equating the values under different types of
benefit systems for the purpose of establishing factors for comparison. This
is required to avoid discrimination in favor of upper level employees. For
the purpose of meeting nondiscriminatory coverage requirements, exceptions
apply to compensation used in determining OASI benefits. 217 A classification
is not considered discriminatory merely because it excludes employees whose
entire remuneration is subject to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) tax. Neither is a plan considered discriminatory merely because the
contributions or benefits based on that part of an employee's compensation
that is not subject to FICA tax differ from the benefits that are subject to
such tax. A plan is not considered discriminatory merely because the contributions or benefits differ because of any retirement benefits under state
218
or federal law.
Retirement benefits provided under state or federal law are parts of a
public system. For integration purposes, the public system is treated as part
211.

TAXATION OF DEmmD EMPLOYER AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

286 (Sellin ed.

1960).
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
721,722
218.

113 CONG. REc. H. 443 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1967).
H.R. 12080 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 90-248 (Jan. 2, 1968).
22 P-H PENSION & PROFrr-SHARING REP. No. 22, at 1-2 (1968).
Goodman, Concepts of Integration of Pension and Profit Sharing Plans, INS. L.J.
(1965).
INT. Rav. CODE Of 1954, §401 (a) (5).
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of the employer's plan, and his own separate plan picks up where the
public system leaves off. The problem of integration then becomes one of
determining the value of benefits under the public system, reducing that to
a rate of compensation, and then applying this rate to excess compensation
under the plan for an offset on account of benefits under the public system
or restricting a stepped-up benefit rate under the plan. In determining
whether a classification is discriminatory, consideration is given to the total
benefits resulting to each employee under the plan and under the public
system in ascertaining whether such total benefits establish an integrated and
correlated retirement system that satisfies the requirements for qualification. 219
Under the present approach, the solution achieved is admittedly arbitrary.
An integrated plan may be one of three types: an excess plan, an offset
plan, or a stepped-up benefit rate plan. An excess plan is one under which
employees whose remuneration is below a minimum compensation level, such
as 6,600 dollars per year, are excluded either because of an eligibility requirement or because benefits are based only on compensation in excess of the
stated level. An offset plan does not exclude any employee or any portion
of compensation due to a minimum compensation requirement, and applies
uniform benefit rates to all covered employees regardless of the rate of pay,
but a higher rate of employer contribution is applicable to compensation
220
above a stated level than to compensation below such level.
The first step in the integration process is to determine a unit of comparison. This provides a standard that establishes the ratio of the benefits
under the public system to the compensation on which such benefits apply.
The resulting rate is the ceiling on benefits under the employer's plan as
applied to compensation over and above the remuneration upon which
benefits under the public system are computed. In theory, under a properly
integrated plan, the benefits, as a percentage of compensation in excess of
the compensation on which the benefits are computed under the public system,
are no greater under the employer's plan than under the public system.
2 21
This percentage is the basic integration rate..
As an illustration, when the maximum compensation level under Social
222
Security was 3,600 dollars, the basic integration rate was 37.5 per cent.

This rate remained unchanged when the covered compensation rose to 4,200
dollars and to 4,800 dollars.2 2 3 These rates were established by determining
the percentage that the total OASI benefits bore to the maximum average
monthly compensation under Social Security and then reducing by the percentage attributable to employee contributions. For this purpose, the total
OASI benefits have been considered to be the maximum primary insurance
benefit, plus 50 per cent for supplementary and survivor benefits, for a total
of 150 per cent of the primary benefit. The proportion of the total benefits
219. Treas. Reg. §1.401-3 (e) (1) (1963).
220. Mimeo. 6641, 1951-1 CuM. BuLL. 41, as modified by Rev. Rul. 61-75, 1961-1 CUM.
BuLL. 140. See also Goodman, supra note 217, at 723.
221. Goodman, supra note 217, at 724.
222. Mimeo 6641, supra note 220.
223. Treas. Reg. §1.401-3 (3) (2) (i) (1963).
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attributable to employee contributions has varied from 6.25 to 22 per cent of
22 4
the total benefits.
When the basic integration rate was established at the 3,600 dollar level,
the primary insurance benefit of 80 dollars was used as the numerator, over
the maximum average monthly compensation of 300 dollars as the denominator, resulting in a first step rate of 26.67 per cent. This was then increased
by 50 per cent for supplementary and survivor benefits, totalling 40 per cent.
This percentage was reduced by 6.25 per cent for the portion attributable to
employee contributions, producing a basic integration rate of 37.5 per cent.
At the 4,800 dollar level, the maximum primary benefit had risen to 127
dollars and the portion attributable to employee contributions had increased
to approximately 22 per cent. Dividing 127 dollars by 400 dollars equals
31.75 per cent, and 150 per cent of that equals 47.625 per cent, reduced by
22 per cent, again produced a basic rate of 37.5 per cent. Adjustments were
required for early retirement, death benefits, or where benefits at retirement
were not in the form of a life annuity. This rate also required at least 15
years of service and normal retirement age of not lower than 65 for men
and 60 for women. Conversions were necessary from the 37.5 per cent rate,
applicable to flat benefit plans, to a 1.24 per cent rate for unit benefit plans,
225
and a 9.37 per cent for money purchase plans.
New Integration Rules
The increase in the Social Security wage base to 6,600 dollars in 1965
prompted review of existing integration formulas.2 2 6 One early view considered a basic rate of 27.27 per cent (4800/6600 x 37.5 per cent) for pension
plans integrating with compensation above 4,800 dollars per year.227 This
was a simple solution that did not draw the fire of objectors.
In September 1966, the Treasury issued Announcement 66-58,228 requesting comments upon an illustrative formula derived from the application of
existing integration concepts to the new wage base. This approach called
for a new basic rate of 24 per cent, applicable to compensation in excess of
4,800 dollars. The Service pointed out that under the 1965 Social Security
Act, the maximum benefit payable to an eligible employee retiring in 1966
is 132.70 dollars, or 34.5 per cent of average monthly wages. An eligible employee retiring in the year 2004, the first year of maximum old-age benefits
under the Act, would receive a maximum of 168 dollars, or 30.5 per cent of
average monthly wages. The average of these percentages is 32.5 per cent.
Further, the Service stated that the total OASI benefits continue to be approximately equal in value to 150 per cent of the primary insurance benefits.
Therefore, the total maximum benefit with respect to the average employees
now in the work force was considered as equivalent to a straight life annuity
224. Treas. Reg. §IA01-3 (e) (2) (1963); Goodman, supra note 217, at 724.
225. 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
226. Goodman, supra note 217, at 725-26.
227. Id.
228. Announcement 66-58, 1966 INT. REv. Bu.L. No. 38, at 87.
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beginning at age 65 of 48.75 per cent of average monthly wage, or 150 times
32.5 per cent.
In considering the percentage of the Social Security contribution now
attributable to the employees, the Service.assumed that the average employee
now in the work force will retire in 1990, and that such employee, eligible
for the maximum benefits, will contribute 52.5 (assuming a 3.5 per cent
interest rate ) or 56.8 per cent (assuming a 3.75 per cent interest rate) of
the cost of his Social Security benefits.
The announcement reasoned that even though less than 50 per cent of
an employee's benefit is attributable to the employer, since the Social Security
system is funded through equal employer-employee contributions, 50 per
cent of the total benefit should be attributed to each. In applying a 50 per
cent fraction to 48.75 per cent of average monthly wage, regarded as the
equivalent of the maximum benefit, a basic rate of 24 per cent was produced.
How this percentage is any more or less valid than the present formula was
not explained.
Employing this proposed formula, a noncontributory pension plan, integrated at the 6,600 dollar level, could not give an employee normal annual
retirement benefits (without death benefits) in excess of (a) 24 per cent of
average annual compensation in excess of 4,800 dollars times his pre-1966
service percentage, plus (b) 24 per cent of average annual compensation in
excess of 6,600 dollars times his post-1965 service percentage. Average annual
compensation was defined as average annual compensation over the 5 highest
consecutive years. As a transition, benefits based on service in 1966 and later
years would be adjusted to conform to these maximums, and new plans
giving credit for service prior to 1966 would also have to comply.
Subsequently, the Treasury issued Announcement 66-71,229 emphasizing
that the foregoing formula should not in any way be construed as a proposal,
but was offered only to furnish data on the possible results of an application
of existing integration concepts. The reaction to Announcement 66-58 was
so overwhelmingly opposed to the bases suggested that the Treasury felt it
necessary to support its approach by additional clarification. Chairman Mills
of the House Ways and Means Committee elaborated on the tentative nature
of this proposal on October 21, 1966,23 o and Secretary of the Treasury Fowler
followed with another qualification in an address on October 22, 1966.231
Even these attempts to mollify objectors have not quelled the storm.
Revenue Ruling 67-10232 provided interim integration rules 'for taxpayers
establishing new plans or amending the integration features of existing plans,
but the Service cautioned taxpayers that these rules should not be interpreted
as indicative of the ultimate rules to be incorporated in the amended
regulations.
The interim integration formula for a plan providing benefits or employer
contributions only with respect to compensation in excess of a compensation
229.

Announcement 66-71, 1966 INT. REv. BULL. No. 43, at 62.

230.
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level higher than 4,800 dollars per year will satisfy present integration
requirements if the rate of benefits or employer contributions with respect to
compensation in excess of the compensation level does not exceed the applicable rate determined under the existing formula of 37.5 per cent multiplied
by the ratio of 4,800 dollars to the compensation level; that is, a new basic rate
of 27.27 per cent. For example, a noncontributory plan that (a) is limited
to employees earnings in excess of 6,600 dollars a year, (b) provides no death
benefits before retirement, (c) provides normal retirement benefits only in
the form of a straight life annuity, and (d) only after completion of 15 years
of service and attainment of age 65 will qualitfy if the normal annual retirement benefits cannot exceed 27.27 per cent (37.5 x 48.66) of average annual
compensation over 6,600 dollars, where average annual compensation is
defined as the average over the highest 5 consecutive years. Determination
letters issued to plans satisfying these integration requirements may be relied
233
upon until the amended regulations are issued
The Internal Revenue Service issued its proposed new integration rules
in Announcement 68-49234 in July 1968. The proposed regulations set forth
a rate of 30 per cent as the new integration percentage. This figure was
arrived at by valuing the maximum Social Security benefit package as a
percentage of the maximum wage base and by treating the employer as
providing 50 per cent of the package.
Since the average of the rate of maximum Social Security benefits received
today and the rate payable in 2006 is 36 per cent of the average monthly
wage, total benefits are considered to be 1.5 times this amount, or 54 per
cent. If half is attributable to employer contributions, a rate of 27 per cent
would result. However, future Social Security changes may raise this rate
and, accordingly, the proposed rate is 30 per cent.
A transitional period, not requiring any changes in existing plans until
January 1, 1971, is provided. Only benefits accrued for service after December
31, 1970, need conform to the new formula. For benefits for service after
this later date, a plan may retain its present integration wage level, although
this may not meet the new standards. For example, if a pension plan presently
provides a 37.5 per cent pension on wages in excess of 4,800 dollars and no
pension on wages below that level it may, under the proposed rules, continue
to integrate at the 4,800 dollar wage level with respect to future benefits,
even though Social Security benefits are now earned on the first 7,800 dollars
of wages rather than 4,800 dollars, as was the case prior to 1966. To retain a
nondiscriminatory character it must, however, on or before January 1, 1971,
either add a 7.5 per cent pension on wages below that level or reduce the rate
of benefits on wages above that level, so that the difference is no more than
30 per cent with respect to wages below that level.

233. Id. at 85.
234. P-H PENSION & PROFIT-SHAING REP. 15,089; Announcement 68-49, 1968 INT. Rxv.
BULL No. 29, at 27.
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Review of Proposed Changes
A number of commentators have remarked upon the various Treasury
proposals, which have ranged from the 24 per cent of Announcement 66-58
to the presently proposed 30 per cent rate. Vigorous protests greeted efforts
to integrate at the 24 per cent level- and well they should. In addition
to being a purely arbitrary rate based upon hypothetical assumptions, its
use would have been definitely injurious to the private pension system. A
50 per cent assumption of employee contributions is also unrealistic. No one
presently receiving Social Security benefits has paid for 50 per cent of the cost.
Each of the many increases in the past has been financed out of current
contributions made for covered employees not yet retired. In fact, unless
the benefit level is frozen, which is unlikely, and the program placed on an
actuarial funding basis such a situation can never develop. Even the previous
assumption of 22 per cent for employee contributions represented an overstatement, in the face of continued benefit liberalization. Actually, the employee contributions will not reach the 50 per cent level for years - certainly
one reason why it may be considered inappropriate to apply a 50 per cent
factor now.

23 5

An additional criticism notes that the Treasury's continued use of the
assumption that survivor and family benefits add only 50 per cent to the
primary benefit has created a corollary assumption that an increase in the
primary benefits has been paced by an identical percentage increase in supplemental benefits. This assumption grows increasingly implausible. The
total value of supplementary benefits is nearly 210 per cent of the primary
benefit. The increase in the assumed employee contributions to 50 per cent
would come at a time when the value of the primary benfit was assumed
to be substantially above its actual level.236 This is a very pointed criticism
of Treasury reasoning.
If a decline in the integration percentage from 37.5 to 30 per cent is
adopted, while not as stringent as the 24 per cent proposal of Announcement
66-58, the ultimate result will be a decrease in total retirement benefits above
the 6,600 dollar level and growing larger in proportion to increases in covered
compensation.
Any change in the integration percentage may lead employers to reduce
private pension benefits because of the greater contributions to Social Security,
or to meet prior commitments at the risk of greater discrimination in favor
of some classes of employees. 23 7 This result cannot assist the present healthy
private retirement system. Many voices in labor and industry speak in favor
of retaining the present rate of 37.5 per cent. Lowering the rate to 30 per
cent will require many plans to reduce benefits for employees above the wage
base or increase benefits for lower paid workers. If the employer could not
afford an increase in pension costs, he would be forced to reduce benefits
235.
Effect of
236.
237.

Bret & Lutz, Treasury Proposals Would Limit Pension Plan Benefits; Probable
I.R.S. Action, 26 J. TAXATION 112, 114 (1967).
Id.
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above the wage base.238 A shift in benefits from higher paid employees to
lower paid workers would curtail development and extension of the private
23 9
pension system, in the view of one critic.
A lowering of the integration rate not only will disturb the balance of
existing plans but also will retard the structuring of benefits in proportion to
the retiree's need to maintain his prior standard of living. Measured by
reducing preretirement expenses by those not required after retirement, such
as taxes and work-related expenses, the need not covered at each level by
Social Security is the private pension goal. A survey of supplemental income
needed above the maximum primary benefit, payable in 1988, for individuals
with final average earnings of 13,200 dollars, 19,800 dollars, and 26,400 dollars
demonstrated the percentage requirements clustered around the 37.5 per
cent level.240 A needs-related program of old-age assistance has long com241
manded general acceptance.
One basic criticism of any integration rules is that they should be expressed by statute instead of regulations.242 Actuarial designations for each
category of benefits (Old Age Benefits, Survivor and Death Benefits, and
Disability Benefits) has been suggested. 243 These standards should be legislatively adopted and not left to the Treasury Department.
However, the compromise rate of 30 per cent is a midground from which
some progress may be made. It neither presents a drastic departure from
37.5 per cent, nor does it impose a rigid schedule for transition of existing
plans. Recent hearings before the Internal Revenue Service have not yet
produced the final formula, but it is hoped that the same spirit of compromise will continue to prevail.
In the view of other commentators, the expansion of the Social Security
system and the reduction of the percentage level of integration represents
the beginning of the end for the private pension system.24 4 The eventual
curtailment of private retirement system and its replacement by a two-tier
Social Security system has been submitted in theory by some government staff
personnel. Consisting of a basic compulsory plan and a voluntary supplementary plan, the basic plan would be mandatory and the additional benefits
left to collective bargaining decision or to the choice of the individual selfemployed. Larger benefits could be provided because, like Social Security
today, both plans would be basically unfunded.24 5 This supplementary plan
would definitely squeeze the private pension industry to a point where it
might be no longer feasible to provide private pension benefits other than
the "brass-hat" or executive compensation program used in Great Britain.
When one observes the current efforts to increase Social Security benefits,
238.

21 P-H PENSION & PaoFrr-SMNUuG RP. No. 50, at 8 (1967).
& P OFrr-SHAIUNG REP. No. 1, at 5 (1967).
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241.
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increase Social Security taxes, and decrease the percentage of integration, while
proposing other changes to raise costs and increase benefits regarding vesting
and funding, it is obvious that some restriction of private pension coverage
is inevitable if these efforts continue.
CONCLUSION

Federal regulation of the private retirement system appears certain, with
only the question of degree yet to be resolved. The concept of the private
pension system as a government-subsidized supplement to OASI forecasts even
greater control than initially proposed. Several observations concerning
current proposals will be offered to conclude this article.
Growth of the private pension systems has been attributed to lenient tax
laws by the Cabinet Committee and Treasury, and this assistance is offered as
a reason for federal regulation. To credit only tax policy with the current
size of this institution is not accurate. A combination of a number of socioeconomic forces, including high corporate profits during World War II and
the impetus of collective bargaining following the Inland Steel decision,
together with the great depression of the 1930's and the needs of business to
attract and retain good employees all worked to develop the private pension
system into what it is today. Small business may not have been attracted to
private pensions without tax incentives, but major industry would have had
to provide private retirement with or without the aid of our tax laws.
It would appear that apart from investment and fiduciary control contained in the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, the only effective
government supervision of private pensions is exercised by the Internal
Revenue Service. But whether this function is really their job may be
questioned. A special Retirement Commission, devoted entirely to supervising the private pension system, comparable in scope and authority to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, would offer expertise and provide more
effective control. The Internal Revenue Service is primarily a revenue collecting agency. Whether a pension plan is functioning properly is hardly a
matter for its concern. To its credit, the Service has done a good job of
preventing gross abuses in administration and discrimination, but if the private system has grown so large that it requires regulation because of its size
alone, then it should be regulated properly. The Internal Revenue Service
is not equipped to perform this task. The creation of a federal agency, such
as a Retirement Commission, to administer federal laws relating to private
retirement is proposed. Further, all except purely tax laws should be removed
from the Internal Revenue Code and codified separately. Present tax law
performs far more than its intended purpose of collecting national revenue
in the field of private retirement. Historically, it simply grew to be this way.
This fact does not excuse the results. Appropriate statutes should be designed
to treat the problems. A pension and retirement act to preempt the area
to control over all private retirement, to be administered by a Retirement
Commission, with the power to issue regulations interpreting this legislation,
is also proposed.
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The Cabinet Committee endorsed the private pension system, noting
that public policy should continue to provide appropriate incentives to
private plan growth and improving the basic soundness and equitable character of such plans, set a stronger foundation for future development.246 The
most important pension issue today is whether such regulation will permit
the private pension system to continue at all.
The primary charges against the private retirement system, brought by
the Cabinet Committee, are that despite its rapid growth and basically sound
character, it is not growing fast enough. Inadequate vesting, inadequate
funding, inadequate coverage, lack of guarantee of benefits and control over
administration are the basic issues.247
No minimum standard of vesting is provided by present law, with the
exception of vesting on termination. Studies subsequent to the Committee's
report indicate a trend toward more liberal vesting in private pensions even
without any minimum requirements. The core of the present problem is the
quality of such vesting. Deferred full vesting, a form frequently used, leaves
too great a gap for employees who need to change jobs before retirement.
This situation is not only unfair, but has a deterrent effect upon labor
mobility. A minimum age requirement also appears to be the one factor
limiting effective vesting under present practices. Years of service alone
should accomplish the desired purpose and be more effective in providing
vesting. Of course, costs are a basic consideration. Vesting should assure
promised benefits, not cause them to be eliminated. Related to vesting is the
question of transferability of pension credits or portability. Freezing benefits
as of the date of separation further reduces the ability of private retirement
to maintain an adequate standard of living. The existing OASI machinery
would appear to provide the most effective and least expensive method of
keeping track of vested credits. Multiemployer pools of pension credits may
be voluntarily attempted to maintain investments of pension funds. 248
If one can assume the validity of the Committee's cost estimates, the best
alternative in vesting is a plan of deferred graded vesting, with a 10-year
minimum service requirement for vesting 50 per cent of benefits, with full
vesting after 20 years of service. This method would provide the greatest
benefit security at the least cost.
A transitional period should be offered to plans in which the cost of
mandated vesting and funding together will run above 10 per cent of current
levels. Several alternatives should be provided to insure flexibility. This
procedure should solve the portability problem, while enhancing labor
mobility.
Present concern with inadequate funding does not seem justified by
studies completed subsequent to the Committee's report. 249 Although data
is incomplete for an evaluation of the entire pension system, funding is in246.
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creasing in most plans studied, averaging 69 per cent in 1964. The chief
assault upon present funding practice centers around overly optimistic
promises of benefits and inordinately long funding of past service credits.
The dispute is basically over actuarial assumptions. Yet current staff proposals for mandatory funding have omitted any effort at developing standard
actuarial assumptions. Lengthy past service funding has not been established
as the reason for the spectacular plan failures, Studebaker and Packard,
which triggered current funding concern. Both of these plans utilized a
30-year funding schedule for past service credits- the method recommended
by the Committee.
The greatest concern should be with premature plan termination. The
largest benefit losses occur when plans terminate within the first 10 years of
existence.2 50 Reinsurance would do more to eliminate these unfortunate
results than the most elaborate mandatory funding, short of immediate full
funding, an obviously unworkable alternative. Although costs are almost
impossible to forecast accurately, a "pool" of premiums from qualified plans
to guarantee benefits of all participating plans meeting minimum standards
would provide benefit protection at little more than nominal cost to any
participant. A higher contribution should be required of plans in the first
10 years of their existence when the risk of benefit loss would be the greatest,
and with minimum investment standards, both the risk of loss from premature
termination and investment declines should be protected. A suggested premium of one per cent of current cost could be attempted initially. This rate
would be an experimental premium since there is no real basis for estimating
this cost.
One can hardly dispute the need for more adequate pension disclosure
when attempting to gather information with which to evaluate some of the
proposals made for private pension legislation. Higher and more definite
standards of fiduciary responsibility are also needed. Both should become
law during 1968.
Most plans are already funding benefits over the 25- to 30-year period
suggested by the Treasury and the committee respectively. This requirement
should not add as much to plan cost as mandatory vesting. However, it is
believed more important to provide vesting than it is to achieve ultimate
fulfillment of an arbitrary funding goal. A transitional period should be
provided to enable plans to phase in both vesting and funding requirements
when costs for both would be in excess of 10 per cent of current levels.
Vesting should have a higher priority. A 30-year funding period for past
service credits would seem adequate if coupled with a federally supervised
program of reinsurance, administered by a Retirement Commission. If one
can again assume the validity of the committee's cost estimates, these proposals would increase total vesting and funding costs by no more than 10
per cent and attempt reinsurance at a one per cent cost. Providing protection
when and where needed should be more important than conforming to
abstract concepts of pension eqality. These measures will probably retard
250. Beier, supra note 153.
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some expansion of private pensions, but should be more than replaced by
current amendments to Social Security.
No changes are necessary in .existing integration concepts. Admittedly,
the basic assumptions presently used are arbitrary, but no more so than
those used by the Treasury in Announcement 66-58. If a change must be
made, and one may well be inevitable, a lengthy transition period should be
provided so as to do the least damage to the thousands of plans already
integrated at the 37.5 per cent rate.
The Labor Department bill, entitled "Pension Benefit Security Act," introduced during the second session of the 90th Congress, appears more
nearly to embody sensible features of mandatory vesting with transitional
alternatives, minimum funding with power of enforcement, reinsurance
benefits against the risk of premature termination at a reasonable cost, as
well as supervision in the hands of the Department of Labor instead of the
Internal Revenue Service. This legislation most closely parallels the opinions
of this writer on the subjects of vesting, funding, and reinsurance.
The latest Treasury proposals for a change in the integration formula in
Announcement 68-49 appear to be more acceptable than earlier versions.
While no changes are felt necessary, at least if one is inevitable, a 30 per
cent rate is not overly stringent and a fair transitional period is provided.
Government control and minimum requirements are almost a reality.
These standards will guide private pensions toward uniformity, equality, and
continuity allowing this institution to achieve a position in the front rank
of the American economy. Members of Congress should approach the task
of writing- new laws with utmost caution and inquire exhaustively before
accepting recommendations from the Cabinet Committee or Treasury staff.
More detailed information concerning the private pension system than is now
available should be gathered and analyzed. The future of private pensions
depends upon prudent legislation.
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